Conceptual Metaphors of Emotion in Spoken Language: Good Is Up in Semantics and Prosody by Godfrey, Hazel K
1 
 
 
 
CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS OF EMOTION IN SPOKEN LANGUAGE: GOOD 
IS UP IN SEMANTICS AND PROSODY 
 
 
HAZEL K. GODFREY 
 
 
 
 
A thesis  
submitted to the Victoria University of Wellington  
in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Masters of Science in Psychology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Victoria University of Wellington 
2011 
 
2 
Abstract 
 Recent research on embodied cognition points to a role for the perceptuomotor 
system in conceptual representation. One way that the perceptuomotor system may be 
involved in conceptual representation is through metaphorical mappings, as described 
in Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). This theory accounts for 
the embodiment of abstract concepts with metaphoric mappings to perceptuomotor 
properties. Examples include INTELLIGENCE IS LIGHT (as in “that is a bright 
idea”), IMPORTANT IS BIG (as in “that is a big deal”), and INTIMACY IS 
CLOSENESS (as in “you are close to my heart”). The GOOD IS UP (as in “things are 
looking up”) conceptual metaphor is the focus of this thesis. A prediction derived 
from Conceptual Metaphor Theory is that activation of the concept of “good” should 
automatically activate associated perceptuomotor processes, resulting in an attentional 
shift to upper visual space. Conversely activation of the concept “bad” should result in 
an attentional shift to lower visual space. There is experimental evidence for the 
existence of the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor. However, this past research has 
only assessed the validity of the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor with written 
emotion-related words. In order to paint an accurate picture of the nature of 
conceptual representation, both written and spoken language processing must be 
investigated.  
 The aim of this thesis was to determine whether the conceptual metaphor 
GOOD IS UP is activated by processing of spoken emotional words. Spoken language 
has two channels through which emotion can be conveyed; the semantic channel and 
the prosodic channel. This thesis assessed whether the GOOD IS UP conceptual 
metaphor was activated by emotional semantics and prosody separately. Semantically 
or prosodically valenced words were presented to participants. Positive and negative 
valence would be expected to elicit activation of the GOOD IS UP conceptual 
metaphor; thus GOOD IS UP congruent shifts in attention were expected. Following 
presentation of the spoken word, a visual target detection and identification task was 
completed to assess attention to upper and lower space. No metaphor congruent shifts 
in attention were observed, which suggests that the GOOD IS UP conceptual 
metaphor was not activated when words with semantic or prosodic emotion were 
processed. A thorough evaluation is provided of the differences between the previous 
studies, using written stimuli, and the current studies, using spoken stimuli. The 
discrepancies suggest that it is theoretically important to define the boundary 
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conditions under which evidence for conceptual metaphor congruent activation is (and 
is not) seen. Whether context is an important boundary condition especially needs to 
be considered. A multiple systems view of representation may need to be applied to 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory. 
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Conceptual metaphors of emotion in spoken language: GOOD IS UP in 
semantics and prosody 
How concepts are represented in the mind has been the object of intense 
theorising and empirical investigation. As a result, many different theories have been 
developed to explain how representation is accomplished in the mind. The nature of 
conceptualisation, described by the different theories, is not a philosophy-free 
selection. The way we represent concepts and what is included in our representations 
is seen as key to what it means to be human (Johnson, 2007). It is not surprising, 
therefore, that some theories of representation are controversial. 
Theories of conceptual representation can be divided into two broad dominant 
views. Proponents of the traditional view (e.g. Collins & Quillian, 1969; Katz & 
Fodor, 1963; Fodor, 1985), posit that conceptual representations are stored in their 
own independent system, which entails that there is no overlap with other systems 
(such as the perceptuomotor system) in the mind (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; 
Winkielman, Niedenthal, & Oberman, 2008). The disconnection from the 
perceptuomotor system necessitates that the form of representation is symbolic and 
non-perceptual.  
Proponents of the alternative view, grounded cognition (see Barsalou, 1999, 
2008, 2010; Barsalou, Santos, Simmons, & Wilson, 2008; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; 
Gibbs, 2006; Gibbs & Matlock, 2008; Johnson, 2007; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999; 
Niedenthal, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2004; Niedenthal, 2007; Wilson, 2002; 
Winkielman et al., 2008), posit that conceptual representations are non-modular, that 
is, they are not instantiated in a separate representational system, but are distributed 
across the evolutionarily older perceptual-motor areas. Meaning is thus embodied. 
This is a controversial view (Barsalou, 2008; Grush, 2003; Haselarger, de Groot, & 
van Rappard, 2003). Grounded cognition theorists strongly propose that the mind uses 
the evolutionary older perceptual and motor systems to represent both concrete and 
abstract concepts. It is relatively easy to see how such an embodied representation 
system could work for concepts at the more concrete end of the concrete-abstract 
continuum, which have clear perceptuomotor components. For instance, in the 
grounded view the concept of an apple is not, as in a traditional semantic-network 
model, represented by a node connected to other nodes in an encapsulated 
representation system containing abstract information (such as an apple is a fruit, is 
red or green, and is juicy). Rather, areas of the perceptuomotor system, including 
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visual, auditory, olfactory, tactile, taste, and motor movements, that were activated 
when experiencing an apple, are partially reactivated when the concept of an apple is 
retrieved (Barsalou, 1999). 
 Concrete concepts such as an apple have a solid real world counterpart which 
people can interact with and experience directly. It is harder to picture how such 
embodied grounding of concepts could work for more abstract concepts such as 
emotion-related concepts which do not have such intrinsic perceptuomotor properties 
as more concrete concepts do. In the traditional view there is debate about whether 
emotion and non-emotional cognition are independent, interact, or are integrated 
(Barnard, Duke, Byrne, & Davidson, 2007; Duncan & Feldman-Barrett, 2007; Gray, 
Braver, & Raichle, 2002; Lazarus, 1984; Leventhal & Scherer, 1987; Zajonc, 1984). 
Most traditional theories of representation assume some additional abstract aspect of 
meaning is attached to emotional concepts, as in the dimensional view (positive or 
negative; see Kövecses, 2000 and Niedenthal, 2008). Furthermore, in the case of 
semantic-network models, problems arise such as circularity in what defines meaning 
in a node; meaning is entirely achieved in the links from one node to another 
(Niedenthal, 2008). In the grounded view, parsimony is achieved by grounding 
representation of all concepts, not just concrete concepts, in the perceptuomotor 
systems. There are many instances in the literature that point to a role for embodied 
grounding in emotional concept representation (for example, Hauk, Johnsrude, & 
Pulvermüller, 2004; Havas, Glenberg, & Rinck, 2007; Havas, Glenberg, Gutowski, 
Lucarelli, & Davidson, 2010; Niedenthal, Winkielman, Mondillon, & Vermeulen, 
2009; Willems, Labruna, D’Esposito, Ivry, & Casasanto, 2011). A larger number of 
theories have grounded cognition as the cornerstone of conceptual representation. The 
version of relevance to this thesis is Conceptual Metaphor Theory. According to 
conceptual metaphor theorists, the grounding problem for abstract emotion concepts 
is solved by grounding representations in the perceptuomotor system via metaphorical 
mappings. 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) developed Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
from the observation of three recurring effects: grounded cognition, unconscious 
processing, and the metaphoric nature of abstract thought. Like other grounded 
cognition theorists, proponents of Conceptual Metaphor Theory suggest that our 
conceptual system is not disembodied but is grounded; determined by the nature of 
12 
 
our bodies, how we process the world through our perceptual system, and interact 
with it through our motor system (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory differs from other grounded cognition theories in that the primary focus is on 
the metaphoric mappings that are claimed to underlie abstract thought. These 
conceptual metaphors are deemed to be necessary to explain how abstract ideas, such 
as emotional concepts, are grounded.  
 The core principle of Conceptual Metaphor Theory is that metaphoric 
mappings, from source domains to target domains, underlie representation. The 
source domain is a perceptuomotor determined experience, for example brightness, 
verticality, or warmth. The target domain is a concept, for example happiness, 
dominance, or affection. The developmental origins of these conceptual metaphor 
mappings are a matter of debate, though most authors attribute the development of 
source-target mappings to repetitive co-activation of both domains (Grady, 1997 as 
cited in Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Tolaas, 1991). It is 
proposed that such repetitive co-activation is pervasive in development and results in 
the neural storage of many conceptual metaphors.  
In the emotional domain, it is hypothesised that the source domain temperature 
is repetitively mapped onto the target domain affection (as in the body temperature 
observed during a hug between caregiver and child) to form the conceptual metaphor 
AFFECTION IS WARMTH; the source domain proximity is mapped onto the target 
domain intimacy (as in the proximity between the child and their caregivers) to form 
the conceptual metaphor INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS; the source domain smell is 
mapped onto the target domain evaluation (as in the negative evaluative response 
commonly paired with disgusting smells) to form the conceptual metaphor BAD IS 
STINKY; and the source domain verticality is mapped onto the target domain valence 
(as in the repeated pairing of the positive appearance of the caregiver from above the 
child), to form the conceptual metaphor GOOD IS UP/BAD IS DOWN1 (Grady, 1997 
as cited in Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).  
Regardless of the origin of conceptual metaphors, theorists agree that they are 
used during linguistic processing; they are the representational system. Furthermore, 
as conceptual metaphors are formed early in development, through the strengthening 
                                                
1From now on this will be referred to as GOOD IS UP. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) use the convention 
TARGET DOMAIN IS SOURCE DOMAIN to describe conceptual metaphors. I will also use this 
convention.  
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of neural connections between source and target domains, conceptual metaphors are 
activated and used for representation unconsciously and automatically. Conceptual 
metaphor theorists argue that these source-target domain mappings are not the result 
of shared linguistic conventional metaphors, such as “the sunny side is up”, but rather 
that the linguistic metaphors are the result of grounded source-target domain 
mappings (Gibbs, 2006; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Conceptual metaphors are thus 
embodied (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).  
 In summary, according to Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) conceptual 
metaphors are mappings between perceptuomotor source domains and conceptual 
target domains. These mappings develop through repetitive co-experience of the 
source and the target domains. More abstract thought, about domains such as emotion, 
would not be possible without conceptual metaphors.  Notably, Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory is primarily a linguistic-philosophical theory. Conceptual metaphor theorists 
are concerned with how and why people categorise and process the world the way we 
do with the aim of answering philosophical questions about the nature of people and 
how to live (Johnson, 2007). However, Conceptual Metaphor Theory lends itself to 
empirical validation. Coming from an experimental psychological perspective, Meier 
and Robinson (2005) have derived three testable predictions from Conceptual 
Metaphor Theory to determine whether conceptual metaphors underlie representation 
for emotion-related concepts. 
Predictions derived from Conceptual Metaphor Theory. 
Meier and Robinson’s (2005) first prediction (consistency) is that, if emotion 
concepts are represented using grounded conceptual metaphors, like GOOD IS UP, 
then a processing advantage should be observed for stimuli that have properties 
consistent with the conceptual metaphor. For example, positive stimuli in the upper 
visual-field should be processed faster than positive stimuli in the lower visual-field. 
This prediction has been supported for several conceptual metaphors of emotion 
including GOOD IS UP (Meier & Robinson, 2004), POSITIVE IS BRIGHT (with 
manipulations and judgements of brightness; Meier et al., 2004), and DOMINANCE 
IS UP (measuring trait dominance and with manipulations of verticality; Robinson, 
Zabelina, Ode, & Moeller, 2008).  
Meier and Robinson’s (2005) second prediction (congruency) is that, if 
emotion concepts are represented using conceptual metaphors, then activating target 
domain concepts (like emotion concepts) should activate the perceptuomotor source 
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domain in a metaphor consistent manner. For example consistent with the conceptual 
metaphor GOOD IS UP, processing positive words should activate the 
perceptuomotor source domain of upward-verticality and direct attention to the upper 
space and processing negative words should activate downward-verticality and direct 
attention to the lower space. A metaphor congruent shift in visual attention would be 
observed in an advantage for upper visual-field targets over lower visual-field targets 
after evaluating words as positive, and in an advantage for lower visual-field targets 
over upper visual-field targets after evaluating words as negative. This congruency 
prediction has been supported for the conceptual metaphors GOOD IS UP (Meier and 
Robinson, 2004), and POSITIVE IS BRIGHT (with manipulations of and judgements 
of brightness; Meier, Robinson, Crawford, & Ahlvers, 2007). 
Meier and Robinson’s (2005) third prediction (automaticity) is that, if 
conceptual metaphor mapping is necessary for representation, then conceptual 
metaphor consistent source-target mappings should be present at automatic processing 
stages.  For example, the shifting of attention to the upper visual-field after processing 
a positive word should occur after only a very short delay. This prediction has been 
supported for the conceptual metaphor POSITIVE IS BRIGHT (Meier et al., 2007). 
GOOD IS UP 
The GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor is the focus of this thesis. The 
conceptual metaphor GOOD IS UP describes the mapping between the 
perceptuomotor source domain, verticality, and the conceptual target domain, valence. 
Speculation as to the development of the metaphor focuses on the repeated 
experiential co-occurrence between upper space, from the child’s perspective, and 
appearance of parents and caregivers who provide nutrition and care; on the co-
occurrence of being prone with being helpless; on the co-occurrence of erect posture 
with confidence and happiness and slumped posture with depression (Tolaas, 1991); 
and on the co-occurrence of death with being buried in the ground below (Crawford, 
2009). Cross linguistic studies suggest that the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor is 
universal. For example, Luodonpää-Manni and Viimaranta (2010) examined the 
validity of metaphors that use the source domain, verticality, in Russian and French. 
They used dictionary sources to see if the conceptual metaphors listed by Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980) as being present for English speakers were descriptive of Russian and 
French speakers’ source-target domain mappings. The analysis conducted by 
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Luodonpää-Manni and Viimaranta demonstrates that the verticality metaphor 
mapping the source domain verticality to GOOD and BAD2 is a basic important 
metaphor across cultures. 
Evidence for the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor. 
Researchers have developed paradigms in which emotional valence and 
verticality of the stimuli are manipulated with the direct aim of testing the cognitive 
reality of the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor. Meier and Robinson (2004) 
presented positive and negative words in the upper or lower visual-field on a 
computer screen. Participants were required to evaluate the word as positive or 
negative by saying “positive” or “negative” out loud after the word was presented. 
Response times were faster when the emotional valence of the words matched the 
vertical position as predicted by the conceptual metaphor GOOD IS UP. That is, 
participants were faster to evaluate words as positive in the upper visual-field and as 
negative in the lower visual-field. This pattern of results is in line with Meier and 
Robinson’s (2005) first prediction of consistency, that if emotional concepts are 
represented using conceptual metaphors, then a processing advantage should be 
observed for stimuli that have properties consistent with the conceptual metaphor (in 
this case vertical position).  
In Meier and Robinson’s (2004) second study, a similar result was found when 
participants evaluated an emotional word before completing a visual-attention task. 
As in their first study, the evaluation response was given orally using the valence 
labels “positive” or “negative”. After evaluating a centrally presented positive word, 
participants were faster to indicate whether a visual target was the letter p or q in the 
upper visual-field than in the lower visual-field. Conversely, after evaluating a 
centrally presented negative word participants were faster to discriminate between a p 
and q in the lower visual-field than in the upper visual-field. Thus, activating the 
conceptual metaphor GOOD IS UP shifted visual attention to the conceptual 
metaphor appropriate position. This is consistent with Meier and Robinson’s (2005) 
second prediction of metaphor congruent perceptual processing, that if emotion 
concepts are represented using conceptual metaphors, then activating target domain 
                                                
2 I will follow Luodonpää-Mannii and Viimaranta and call the mapping between verticality and 
emotion GOOD IS UP, rather than HAPPY IS UP, or POSITIVE IS UP. The name of the conceptual 
metaphor is not as important as the relevant source and target domains, verticality (upper and lower 
space) and dimensional valence (positive and negative). 
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concepts should activate the perceptuomotor source domain (and associated 
processing) in a metaphor congruent manner. 
While Meier and Robinson (2005) were confident that the paradigms used in 
their 2004 study were appropriate for testing the cognitive reality of conceptual 
metaphors, patterns of responding consistent with the GOOD IS UP conceptual 
metaphor are also observed with paradigms that used more subtle manipulations of 
verticality. Casasanto (2008, as cited in Brookshire, Ivry, & Casasanto, 2010) and 
Brookshire et al. (2010) used tasks in which the shift between upper and lower target 
position was not so noticeable. In a spatial-interference antonym-judgement task, 
Casasanto presented participants with words positioned above fixation and below 
fixation. Participants were faster to say that the word pairs were antonyms (they had 
the opposite meaning) when the word pair positioning was consistent with the GOOD 
IS UP conceptual metaphor, that is, when the positive word was above fixation, and 
the negative word below, than when it was inconsistent. In a spatial-interference 
lexical decision task, Casasanto again presented participants with word pairs, one 
word of the pair was positioned above and one below fixation. One word of the pair 
was a real word, either positive or negative, and one was a non-word. Participants 
were faster to make a lexical decision when the real word of the pair was in the 
position consistent with the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor, that is, when the real 
positive word was presented above the non-word, and the real negative word below, 
than vice versa.  
In the Casasanto (2008) studies there were stimuli in both the upper and lower 
visual-field on each trial. It was the positioning of the valenced word of the pair that 
was critical. Because both positions were filled on each trial, the vertical positioning 
of the valenced word was less salient. Yet speed of responding was consistent with 
the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor; which fits with Meier and Robinson’s (2005) 
first prediction of consistency, that if emotional concepts are represented using 
conceptual metaphors, then a processing advantage should be observed for stimuli 
that have properties consistent (in this case in terms of their vertical position) with the 
conceptual metaphor.   
In Brookshire et al. (2010) a single word was presented on each trial. That 
word was coloured purple or green, and the participants’ task was to decide on the 
font colour. Participants pressed and held a centre key to start the trial. To identify the 
font colour they released the centre key and moved to the purple or green key, which 
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were positioned above and below the centre key. Even though the emotional valence 
of the stimuli was irrelevant to the task, participants were faster to release the centre 
key and press the key in the upper-position when identifying the font colour of 
positive words than of negative words, and faster to release the centre key, and press 
the key in the lower-position when identifying the font colour of negative words than 
of positive words. Brookshire et al’s results are consistent with Meier and Robinson’s 
(2005) second prediction of metaphor congruent perceptual processing, that if 
emotion concepts are represented using conceptual metaphors, then activating target 
domain concepts should activate the perceptuomotor source domain in a metaphor 
congruent manner.  
Pervasive metaphor. 
The GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor is pervasive. First, it is not limited to 
verticality in the visual domain. There is evidence that verticality effects extend to the 
auditory and bodily domains. Weger, Meier, Robinson, and Inhoff (2007) reported 
that evaluating positive words biased participants to identify tones as high pitched and 
evaluating negative words biased participants to identify tones as low pitched. This 
mapping is consistent with the conceptual metaphor GOOD IS UP, as high tone and 
low tones are also mapped to upper and lower space (see Bernstein & Edelstein, 1971; 
Chiou & Rich, 2011; Evans & Treisman, 2010 for evidence of the HIGH PITCH IS 
UP metaphor). Meier and Hauser (2008; as cited in Crawford, 2009) reported 
consistency between the valence of the word participants were evaluating and the part 
of the body with which they responded. Participants were faster to evaluate positive 
words with their finger (part of the upper body) than with their foot (part of the lower 
body), and were faster to evaluate negative words with their foot than with their 
finger.  
Second, the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor is not only activated by 
evaluation of single word stimuli. General mood experience also shifts visual 
attention in a pattern consistent with the conceptual metaphor (Meier & Robinson, 
2006). Degree of neuroticism was correlated with vertical attention bias. The higher 
participants were on neuroticism scores, the faster they were to respond to targets in 
the lower visual-field (regardless of the stimulus valence). A stronger correlation was 
found with depression. The higher participants scored on a measure of depression, the 
faster they were to respond to targets in the lower visual-field. As an aside, it is 
interesting to consider what role body specific effects may have played in these 
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correlations in addition to valence specific effects. For example, depressed people 
generally have a more slumped posture compared to non-depressed controls 
(Michalak, Troje, Fischer, Vollmar, Heidenreich, & Shulte, 2009), and focusing on 
achieving a more erect posture is a part of some therapies for depression (Steckler & 
Young, 2009).  
Third, there is also non-linguistic evidence for the GOOD IS UP conceptual 
metaphor, which reaffirms that conceptual metaphor mapping is a general cognitive 
process, and not a representation specific to language. Meier and Hauser (2008; as 
cited in Crawford, 2009) reported that participants’ intuitions of valenced tattoo 
positions were biased in the direction of the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor. 
Participants preferred positive tattoos to be on the upper body, and negative tattoos to 
be on the lower body. Crawford, Margolies, Drake, and Murphy (2006) explored 
whether valence biased participants’ memory for the position of pictorial stimuli. The 
vertical position in which participants remembered a positive picture being presented 
was higher than its original position, and the position in which participants 
remembered a negative picture was lower than its original presentation. This GOOD 
IS UP congruent memory bias was evident both with pictures drawn from the 
International Affective Picture System (IAPS) and with yearbook pictures paired with 
valenced descriptions; and was evident immediately and after a long delay between 
viewing the picture and position recall. The Crawford et al. study is additional 
evidence for the processing of valenced stimuli activating metaphor congruent 
perceptuomotor processing (Meier & Robinson’s, 2005, second prediction). Viewing 
a valenced picture with the aim to remember its position activated GOOD IS UP 
consistent perceptuomotor processes and biased the remembered location. 
Spoken Language 
The studies given as evidence for the cognitive reality of the conceptual 
metaphor GOOD IS UP can be mostly divided into two types: those that used 
manipulations of mood, or measures of personality, to assess the presence of the 
verticality-emotion mapping; and those that used manipulation of linguistic stimuli. 
Those studies which used non-linguistic manipulations contribute to our 
understanding of the nature of conceptual metaphoric representation because they 
demonstrate that conceptual metaphoric processing is not specific to linguistic 
processing. Those which use linguistic stimuli are useful too, as exploration of the 
nature of conceptual metaphoric representation during linguistic processing is one 
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way to assess the cognitive reality of conceptual metaphors. However, all of the 
experimental-linguistic studies use written language. This generalisation is also true 
of empirical studies exploring the validity of conceptual metaphors other than GOOD 
IS UP.  
While the studies using written stimuli all report GOOD IS UP consistent 
responding, this does not mean that we should stop questioning the nature of 
conceptual metaphors. This thesis will assess the cognitive validity of the conceptual 
metaphor GOOD IS UP in spoken language processing. Assessing the cognitive 
validity of conceptual metaphors in spoken language will add to the theoretical 
understanding of Conceptual Metaphor Theory. If the same source (verticality) and 
target (positive/negative) mappings are observed with spoken linguistic stimuli as 
with written linguistic stimuli, this would strengthen arguments for conceptual 
metaphoric based representation. If no verticality-emotion mappings are observed 
when processing spoken linguistic stimuli, I would question how broad ranging 
conceptual metaphoric representation is. Investigation of the GOOD IS UP conceptual 
metaphor in spoken language is useful theoretically for several reasons. 
Evolution. 
First, Conceptual Metaphor Theory and other grounded cognition theories 
emphasise repeatedly that there is no separate representation system for concepts. The 
mind uses the evolutionary older perceptual and motor systems (Barsalou, 1999; 
Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). The earliest evidence of written language is approximately 
5000 years old (Harley, 2001) therefore written language developed very recently in 
our cognitive history and presumably makes use of many processes beyond the 
perceptuomotor system. Furthermore, developmentally, people learn to speak before 
they learn to write, and a cognitively normal adult may not be able to read but have 
normal speech (Wurm, Vakoch, Strasser, Calin-Jageman, & Ross, 2001). A more 
stringent test of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, and grounded-cognition theories in 
general, is to examine whether conceptual metaphor congruent processing is present 
when assessed with spoken linguistic stimuli. This theme is emerging in other 
avenues of research. Wurm et al. (2001), and Wurm, Vakoch and Seaman (2004) have 
argued that as spoken language is evolutionarily older than written language; if 
emotional and linguistic processing interact, evidence is more likely to be seen in 
studies of spoken, than written, language. Cook (2002) states that, in our evolutionary 
history, pitch in animal calls conveyed information regarding dominance, danger, and 
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mate selection. As an emotion system in the brain developed, pitch, as a component of 
prosody (see the complexity section below), also came to be used to convey emotional 
information. Evidence for this claim is the similarity of animal vocalisations and pitch 
in the human voice (Cook, 2002). If this evolution argument is valid, and there are 
stronger links between the grounded representation system and spoken language than 
with written language, then the role of conceptual metaphors in emotional language 
processing may be more pervasive than is indicated by studies using written language.  
Complexity. 
Second, spoken language is more complex than written language. The use of 
speech allows the controlled manipulation of two channels: semantics (what we say), 
and prosody (how we say it). Prosody is one of the ways that emotion is expressed in 
language and is a feature of spoken language that expresses information at a level 
above segmental features like phonemes. Prosody changes the quality of the segments 
in terms of their pitch, intensity, and length, but not their phonemic nature (Ladd, 
1996). Happy speech has high mean pitch and sad speech has low mean pitch (Banse 
& Scherer, 1996; Scherer, 2003).  
Studies examining the conceptual metaphor GOOD IS UP with written words 
are purely semantic in focus. Although prosody is an extralinguistic property of 
language, there is no reason to think that the conceptual metaphor GOOD IS UP is not 
recruited during processing of emotional prosody. In other areas of research 
interactions between linguistic and prosodic processing have been demonstrated. For 
example, emotional prosody seems to play a role in lexical access. Using a 
homophone spelling task, in which participants listened to a homophone spoken in 
happy, neutral, or sad prosody, then transcribed it, Nygaard and Lunders (2002) 
demonstrated that participants transcribed the emotional spelling of a homophone 
more often when the homophone was spoken in emotional prosody than in neutral 
prosody. Nygaard and Queen (2008) extended the observation of prosodic modulation 
of linguistic processing to non-ambiguous words. Participants were faster to name 
words when the semantics and prosody of the word were congruent. That is, they 
were faster to repeat a spoken semantically-positive word when it was spoken in 
happy prosody (than in sad or neutral prosody) and were faster to repeat a spoken 
semantically-negative word when it was spoken in sad prosody (than in happy or 
neutral prosody).  
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Such studies remind researchers that language is not uni-dimensional. Any 
theory of representation of emotion-related concepts, including Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory, must be able to account for effects of emotion across the range of linguistic 
complexity; in both written and spoken language, and in both the semantic and 
prosodic channels of spoken language. The research conducted up to the current date 
has only evaluated the cognitive validity of the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor 
with written words. An investigation of the relevance of the GOOD IS UP conceptual 
metaphor to representations accessed during spoken word processing is long overdue.  
The Current Studies 
No studies have yet been conducted that were specifically designed to assess 
the cognitive reality of conceptual metaphors in spoken emotional language. For 
evolutionarily and complexity reasons, a better test of the cognitive reality of the 
GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor is to use spoken words rather than written words. 
The aim of studies in this thesis was to examine the role of conceptual metaphors in 
spoken language processing. This thesis explores whether shifts in attention congruent 
with the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor are induced by emotional semantics and 
emotional prosody separately. That is, this thesis tests Meier and Robinson’s (2005) 
second prediction of metaphor congruent perceptual processing for the GOOD IS UP 
conceptual metaphor, that activation of emotion-related concepts activates GOOD IS 
UP congruent shifts in attention. 
 Using a spatial attention paradigm, analogous to that used by Meier and 
Robinson (2004) with visual words, four studies were conducted. Study 1 was 
conducted to ensure that the visual attention paradigm was sensitive to attentional 
manipulation. Study 2 resulted in the creation of well balanced sets of words for use 
in Studies 3 and 4. Study 3 was conducted to determine if spoken words that were 
semantically emotional resulted in GOOD IS UP congruent shifts in attention. Study 4 
was conducted to determine if spoken words that were prosodically emotional 
resulted in GOOD IS UP congruent shifts in attention.  
Studies 1, 3, and 4 were similar in procedure. All used the same dual-task 
procedure involving evaluation of an auditory stimulus followed by a visual attention 
task. The only major difference between the studies was the auditory stimuli used. 
The paradigm was dual-task. In the auditory task component, participants identified 
the auditory cue on a categorical dimension. In Study 1, the auditory cue was a high 
or low pitched tone and participants’ task was to decide if it was Tone X or Tone Y. 
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In Study 3, the auditory cues were semantically negative, neutral, or positive words 
spoken in neutral prosody and participants evaluated the words semantically. In Study 
4, the auditory cues were semantically-neutral words spoken in sad, neutral, and 
happy prosodies, and participants evaluated the words prosodically. 
In the visual attention task component, participants made a speeded target 
detection and identification response to a visual target. In Studies 1, 3, and 4 the 
visual targets were black shapes; a square and a circle. On each experimental trial, the 
auditory cue was presented first, then, after a short or long SOA, the visual target 
could appear. As soon as a shape appeared participants indicated with a key release 
that they had detected the shape and then with a key press identified the shape as a 
square or circle. As the visual attention task was go-no-go there were catch trials on 
which no shape was presented. After responding (or not, on catch trials) to the visual 
target, participants identified (in Study 1) or evaluated (in Studies 3 and 4) the 
auditory cue in terms of its pitch (Study 1), semantic emotion (Study 3), or prosodic 
emotion (Study 4).  
The visual attention task used was inspired by that in Meier and Robinson’s 
(2004) Study 2. In their design participants were presented with a positive or negative 
visual word cue, which they evaluated with a spoken response as positive or negative, 
and subsequently saw a p or a q. The letter target could appear in the upper or lower 
visual-field; however the position of the letter was irrelevant to the task. Participants 
were required to identify the letter by pressing the p key on the keyboard with their 
right index finger or the q key with their left index finger. This paradigm induced 
GOOD IS UP congruent shifts in attention; responses were faster to targets in the 
upper visual-field after presentation of a positive word and faster to targets in the 
lower visual-field after presentation of a negative word. However, in addition to using 
spoken words, the present study included several major methodological modifications 
to the paradigm used by Meier and Robinson (2004). These changes were made in 
order to conduct a more stringent test of the predicted metaphor congruent perceptual 
processing. 
First, the visual targets used in Study 2 of Meier and Robinson (2004) were 
letters, which are linguistic stimuli. A more powerful test of the induction of 
perceptual processing consistent with emotion-verticality mappings is to use non-
linguistic targets. A black square and a black circle were used. The participants’ task 
required a multiple step response. To start each trial participants pressed and held the 
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5 key on the number pad. When a shape was detected participants were instructed to 
release the key as quickly as possible and then to press the key to the left or the right 
of the 5 key to indicate if the shape was a square or circle.   
Second, in everyday life, as well as in experimental settings, there are many 
potential spatial mappings to be considered. In addition to the mappings of interest 
there are also stimulus-response compatibility (SRC) mappings. Participants in Meier 
and Robinson (2004) viewed stimuli that appeared in the upper or lower visual-field 
and responded on keys that were positioned to the left (q) and right (p). People are 
generally faster to respond to lower visual-field targets with a left key and to upper 
visual-field targets with a right key (Weeks & Proctor, 1990). Furthermore, right 
handed participants generally map positive to the right position and negative to the 
left position (Casasanto, 2009). Such SRC and handedness mappings could confound 
any shifts in attention due to the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor and were not 
considered by Meier and Robinson (2004). The verticality paradigm used in this 
thesis was designed to minimise the contribution of these potential mappings to 
response time. First, as in Brookshire et al. (2010), three reaction times were recorded. 
Release time, the time to release a key on detection of a target, should not be affected 
by left-down/ up-right SRC mappings. Press time, the time to press a key to the left or 
the right of a central key, and movement times, the time to move after releasing the 
central key to the left or right key, could be affected by left-lower/ right-upper SRC 
mappings, and so the assignment of shape to key was counterbalanced across 
participants. Finally, to minimise any effect of valence-handedness mappings, all 
participants were right handed. 
Third, in order to be able to make a more powerful claim regarding the 
automaticity of any verticality mappings, the order of the task components was 
changed. In Meier and Robinson (2004), the evaluation of the emotional words 
occurred before the presentation of the visual target. That is, participants saw a word, 
evaluated it, and then saw a visual target to which they responded. A powerful way of 
elucidating the time course of processing is to manipulate Stimulus Onset Asynchrony 
(SOA), the time between the onset of stimulus one, the word, and the onset of 
stimulus two, the shape. With the task component order used by Meier and Robinson 
(2004) their 2005 prediction of automaticity (that metaphor congruent perceptual 
processing, including shifts in attention, will be observed at automatic processing 
stages) is hard to assess. However, by reversing the order of the visual stimulus and 
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the evaluation in conjunction with the use of two SOAs the automaticity prediction 
can be tested. Two SOAs between the spoken word and the visual target are used; a 
short SOA, at which attentional orienting is thought to be automatic, and a long SOA, 
at which attentional orienting is thought to be controlled (Posner, 1980; Posner & 
Snyder, 2004). The auditory cue was presented first, then the visual target to which 
participants made a speeded response, and finally participants made their evaluation 
response to the word. The SOA manipulation also adds unpredictability to the timing 
of the onset of the shape target. With a randomly varying SOA, participants cannot 
get into a regular rhythm of responding.  
Even though the evaluation response does not occur until the end of the trial, 
after the presentation of and response to the visual target, it is still possible to be fairly 
sure that participants were evaluating the valence of the word by comparing response 
times at the short and long SOA. The psychological refractory period (PRP) effect 
describes the phenomenon in dual-task situations where, as the SOA between two 
stimuli decreases, the time to respond to the second stimulus increases (Pashler, 1992; 
1993). Pashler reports that this interference is not due to a delay at stimulus 
perception or response production, but rather to a cognitive-bottleneck at response-
selection. Participants cannot begin the response-selection process for the second 
stimulus (in this case the shape) until a response has been selected, but not necessarily 
produced for the first stimulus (in this case the auditory cue).  Thus if in the current 
paradigm participants are selecting their evaluation response before selecting their 
shape response, response times will be faster at the long SOA than at the short SOA.  
Fourth, the modality of the evaluation response was changed. Participants 
were required to click on a box labelled with tone types, semantic valences (positive, 
neutral, negative) or prosodic valences (happy, neutral, sad). In Meier and Robinson’s 
(2004) paradigm participants spoke the words “positive” or “negative” to evaluate the 
words. Mouse clicks were thought to be less likely, compared to explicit spoken 
production of valenced labels, to result in conceptual metaphor activation due directly 
to the labels used. 
Fifth, neutral valenced words and prosody were included. In everyday 
language there is not a clear contrast between positive and negative themes. They are 
intermixed with neutral words and voices. The inclusion of neutral semantics and 
prosody allows the examination of the contribution of grounded representation in a 
more ecologically valid setting. Furthermore, in order to look at the independent 
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contribution of emotional semantics and prosody separately one channel must be 
neutral.  
These five changes were not expected to reduce the contribution of the GOOD 
IS UP metaphor in conceptual processing. Rather, these changes allowed a more 
stringent test of the cognitive reality of the GOOD IS UP metaphor to be conducted. 
As many confounds as possible have been removed or controlled for and the 
paradigm has been adapted to be more suitable for assessing Meier and Robinson’s 
(2004) predictions of congruency and automaticity. If the GOOD IS UP metaphor 
underlies representation for emotional words then metaphor congruent shifts in 
attention should be observed. After evaluating words that are positive in terms of their 
semantics or prosody, participants should be faster to respond to visual targets in the 
upper visual-field than in the lower-visual field. After evaluating words that are 
negative in terms of their semantics or prosody, participants should be faster to 
respond to visual targets in the lower-visual field than in the upper visual-field.  
STUDY 1 
Study 1 was conducted to ensure that the revised paradigm was sensitive to 
verticality mappings. The conceptual metaphor HIGH PITCH IS UP was chosen to be 
the test of whether metaphor congruent shifts in attention can be observed with this 
paradigm. The conceptual metaphor HIGH PITCH IS UP describes the mapping 
between the perceptuomotor source domain, verticality, and the conceptual target 
domain, pitch. The HIGH PITCH IS UP conceptual metaphor is especially relevant to 
this thesis where prosody is considered, as pitch is a key component of prosody. In 
experiments investigating pitch-verticality mappings participants are generally 
presented with an auditory and a visual stimulus. The auditory stimulus can be high or 
low in pitch. The visual stimulus can be presented in the upper or lower visual-field. 
Facilitation is observed for high pitch upper visual-field and low pitch lower visual-
field pairings, compared to the opposite pairings. It is thought that the HIGH PITCH 
IS UP metaphor originates from repeated experience of the spatial position in which 
high and low pitches resonate in the body. When a speaker produces low pitched 
sounds the vocalisation resonates in the speaker’s chest, whereas when a speaker 
produces high pitch sounds the vocalisation resonates higher than the chest and feels 
like it is resonating in the head area (Zbikowski, 1998). As would be expected from 
such a frequently occurring collocation between pitch and verticality, the pitch-
verticality mapping is very robust (Ben-Artzi & Marks, 1999; Chiou & Rich, 2011; 
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Bernstein & Edelstein, 1971; Evans & Treisman, 2010; Maeda, Kanai & Shimojo, 
2004; Melara & O’Brien, 1987; Occelli, Spence & Zampini, 2009; Sadaghiani, Maier 
& Noppeney, 2009; Shintel, Nusbaum & Okrent, 2006). Infants as young as nine 
months old map ascending tones to upward pointing arrows and descending tones to 
downward pointing arrows (Wagner, Winner, Cicchetti, & Gardner, 1981). In Study 
1, a high- (2000Hz) and a low- (500Hz) tone were used as the auditory stimuli. The 
purpose of Study 1 was primarily to determine if the modified paradigm is suitable for 
investigating auditory-visual verticality mappings. Participants should be faster to 
respond to visual targets in the upper visual-field after listening to the high-tone, and 
faster to respond to visual targets in the lower visual-field after listening to the low-
tone. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 22 (15 female, 7 male; mean age 18.23 years) undergraduate 
students. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, had no hearing deficits, were 
right handed (as assessed by the Waterloo Handedness Questionnaire–Revised; Elias, 
Bryden, & Bulman-Fleming, 1998), and were in the sub-clinical range (not greater 
than 57 out of 80) on anxiety or depression (as assessed by the Zung Anxiety, 1965, 
and Depression Questionnaires, 1971). 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
Both the auditory and visual stimuli were presented using a Dell PC running 
Psychology Software Tools’ E-Prime Suite version 1.1 (Schneider, Eschman, & 
Zuccolotto, 2002). Visual stimuli appeared on a 31cm x 23cm Dell CRT monitor with 
a vertical refresh rate of 60 Hz. Auditory stimuli were presented with Manhattan 
noise-cancelling stereo headphones with circumaural cushions. The output was 
verified using a Phillips sound meter as being approximately 75dB. 
The auditory cues were low- (500Hz) and high- (2000Hz) pure tones of 500ms 
duration. The tones were created in Audacity (version 1.2.6) using the Sine Tone 
Generator. The visual targets were a black square and circle 47 x 47 pixels in size (1.4 
cm x 1.4 cm). The computer monitor was positioned approximately 50cm from the 
participant, on a stand so that centre fixation was 37cm from the table top, and 
approximately at eye level for the participant.  
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Procedure 
This experiment used a dual-task paradigm. Participants performed a visual-
attention task and a tone-identification task. Specifically, on experimental trials 
participants heard a tone, and then saw a shape. Participants were required to make a 
two-step speeded response to detect and then identify the shape, and subsequently to 
make a non-speeded response to identify the tone.  
The tone-identification task required participants to identify the tone they 
heard as Tone X or Tone Y. This letter labelling allowed the experimenter to avoid 
use of the terms “high” and “low” when describing the tones. Such explicit labelling 
using location terms may activate HIGH PITCH IS UP congruent shifts in attention 
alone (Evans & Treisman, 2010). The visual-attention task was a go no-go target 
discrimination task. Participants were required to make a speeded two-step response, 
detection and shape identification, to a present shape. To add an element of 
unpredictability to the target discrimination component of the task, the target could 
appear in one of four of locations; 2cm from the top of the screen (high upper visual-
field; 9.5cm from the centre), 2 cm from the bottom of the screen (low lower visual-
field; 9.5cm from the centre), 3 cm from the top of the screen (medium upper visual-
field; 8.5cm from the centre), or 3 cm from the bottom of the screen (medium lower 
visual-field; 8.5cm from the centre). At an approximate viewing distance of 50cm, the 
high upper visual-field and low lower visual-field positions corresponded to 
approximately 11 degrees to the centre of the shape, and the medium visual-field 
positions corresponded to approximately 10 degrees to the centre of the shape. The 
target appeared 24 times in each of these locations.  
The experiment consisted of 120 trials; 96 target-present trials and 24 catch 
trials in which a tone was heard, but no shape was presented.  For the target-present 
trials, 48 were preceded by the low-tone and 48 by the high-tone. For each of the 48 
low and high trials, 24 had a short SOA (500ms) and 24 a long SOA (1200ms). For 
each of the SOA durations, on 12 trials a square shape followed the beep, and on 12 a 
circle; six were presented in the upper visual-field and six in the lower visual-field.  
Of these, three were presented in the high/low region of the visual-field and three in 
the medium region of the visual-field. In the data analysis stage, the trials were 
collapsed across the high/low and medium positions, and across the shape-type, to 
give 24 upper and lower visual-field targets following a low-tone, and 24 upper and 
lower visual-field targets following a high-tone for each SOA. 
28 
 
See Figure 1 for the target-present trial procedure. A trial started when 
participants pressed and held the 5 key on the number pad with their right index 
finger. Then a fixation cross appeared for a random duration between 1000ms and 
1500ms; participants were instructed to stare at the cross. During the last 500ms of 
this interval the tone was played. After a 0ms or 700ms ISI (to make a 500ms or 
1200mm SOA) a shape appeared on target-present trials. The fixation was displayed 
during the 700ms ISI. However, participants could not use the fixation offset as a cue 
to the onset of a shape target because the catch trials also had a fixation offset that 
corresponded half of the time to the timing used on the target-present trials with a 
short (500ms) SOA and half of the time to the timing used on the target-present trials 
with a long (1200ms) SOA. The shape was displayed for up to 4000ms but terminated 
after a key release and press. On target present trials, participants were instructed to 
release the 5 key as quickly as possible once they had detected the target. Once they 
had detected a target and released the 5 key, participants were instructed to press 4 or 
6 (left or right movement) to indicate if they saw a square or circle. On the catch trials 
participants were instructed to keep pressing the 5 key. 500ms after a response (or the 
full 4000ms in the event of no response as in catch trials), a question screen was 
displayed. Participants used the mouse with their left hand to click on the box 
(labelled Tone X and Y) that corresponded to the tone that they had heard at the 
beginning of a trial. The tone-identification component was included to ensure that 
participants would evaluate the tones as they processed them. After a 1000ms ISI the 
next trial began.  
 
 
29 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Target-present trial procedure in Study 1. 
 
Reaction times for releases and presses from the onset of the shape were 
recorded using E-Prime and the computer’s internal timer. In order to control for 
possible response mapping influences, the assignment of tone to label (500Hz, 
2000Hz; Tone X, Tone Y) and of shape to key (square, circle; 4, 6) were 
counterbalanced across participants. 
Before the 120 experimental trials, participants were given practice trials for 
each task component. As each trial is made up of several components, it was not 
desirable for task complexity to mask any underlying effects. As I did not control for 
typing or game-playing experience, it was especially important that participants be 
trained to use the same finger to release and press keys in order to control for different 
comfort levels with pressing multiple keys. Thus participants completed four sets of 
practice trials. First, they completed ten tone-practice trials on which they only heard 
a tone (five low- and five high-tones) and identified the tone they heard. They were 
given feedback on their tone identification. Second, they completed six release-
practice trials on which they might see a shape (two square, two circle, two catch) and 
released the 5 key upon seeing it. Third, they completed ten press-practice trials on 
which they might see a shape (four square, four circle, and two catch trials) and 
released the 5 key upon seeing it and then identified it by pressing the 4 or 6 keys. For 
the second and third set of practice trials it was made clear to the participants that they 
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should only release and press keys with their right index finger (i.e. not the middle or 
ring fingers). Finally, they completed ten practice trials with all components. 
Results and Discussion 
Two participants were removed from the analysis (see below), resulting in a 
sample of 20 participants (14 female, 6 male; mean age 18.15 years). There were 
three response time variables; the time from the onset of the shape to release the 5 key 
on detection of a target (release time), the time from the onset of the shape to press the 
4 or 6 key to identify the target (press time), and the time between the release and the 
press (movement time). As the key release component of the shape task was a go-no-
go target detection task, the number of catch trials on which participants responded 
was inspected. One participant responded on more than two (out of 24) catch trials 
and was removed from the analysis. Release times below 200ms were deemed 
anticipatory and times above 1500ms as prolonged detection. Therefore, the release 
times for the remaining participants were filtered so that only trials on which the 
release time was greater than 200ms and less than 1500ms were used to calculate a 
median release time for each SOA, tone, and visual-field combination. All 
participants had at least 93 trials (out of 96; maximum 3% data excluded) with which 
to calculate a median release time. Thus, almost no data points were excluded from 
the analysis of release times. 
The key press component of the shape task was a target discrimination task; 
participants were required to report whether they saw a square or a circle. The press 
times excluded trials on which participants identified the shape incorrectly and the 
reaction times were filtered so that only trials on which the press time was greater 
than 200ms were used to calculate a median press time for each SOA, tone, and 
visual-field combination. All participants had at least 90 trials (out of 96; maximum 
6% data excluded) with which to calculate the median press times. One participant 
was removed from the analysis for not meeting this criterion. 
The difference between the auditory stimuli was non-subjective. Tone X and 
Tone Y always differed in fundamental frequency by 1500Hz. All participants scored 
at least 82 percent accuracy on the tone identification task (M = 91%, SD = 8%). 
Nevertheless the analyses below were conducted twice; once with all trials regardless 
of tone-identification accuracy and repeated with only trials on which participants had 
identified the tone correctly. The same main effects and interactions were found. The 
analyses reported below for release, press, and movement times are therefore based on 
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all trials regardless of tone accuracy, contingent on the data filters described above. 
See Table 1 for a summary of the release, press, and movement times. 
 
Table 1.  
Mean (SD) release, press, and movement times (ms) for Study 1 by SOA, tone, and 
visual-field. 
 Release Times 
 Short SOA Long SOA 
Tone Lower VF 
M (SD) 
Upper VF 
M (SD) 
Lower VF 
M (SD) 
Upper VF 
M (SD) 
High-Tone 475 
(111) 
463 
(108) 
463 
(89) 
439 
(87) 
Low-Tone 472 
(100) 
474 
(101) 
443 
(79) 
446 
(91) 
 Press Times 
 Lower VF Upper VF Lower VF Upper VF 
High-Tone 856 
(208) 
870 
(284) 
815 
(263) 
775 
(205) 
Low-Tone 916 
(325) 
846 
(248) 
782 
(224) 
776 
(189) 
 Movement Times 
 Lower VF Upper VF Lower VF Upper VF 
High-Tone 359 
(199) 
390 
(241) 
348 
(219) 
311 
(174) 
Low-Tone 400 
(301) 
369 
(230) 
328 
(215) 
305 
(172) 
 
Release Times 
 The median release times were analysed in a 2 (SOA: 500ms, 1200ms) x 2 
(Tone: low, high) x 2 (Visual-field: upper, lower) repeated-measures ANOVA. Most 
importantly, there was a significant tone x visual-field interaction, F(1, 19) = 7.387, 
MSE = 598, p = .014, ηp2 =.280; that did not interact with SOA, F(1, 19) = .387, MSE 
= 899, p = .541, ηp2 = .020. Follow up paired-samples t-tests indicated that across 
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SOAs for the high-tone trials participants were significantly faster to release the key 
on detecting an upper visual-field target (M = 453ms, SD = 98ms) than a lower visual-
field target (M = 472ms, SD = 99ms), t(19) = -2.777, p = .012. However, although in 
the predicted direction, for the low-tone trials participants were non-significantly 
faster to release the key following a lower visual-field target (M = 457ms, SD = 88ms) 
than an upper visual-field target (M = 461ms, SD = 95ms), t(19) = .662, p = .516. See 
Figure 2. This interaction demonstrates that the paradigm is sensitive to a metaphoric 
shift in attention. Processing of high pitch seemed to shift attention to the upper 
visual-field and the processing of low pitch to the lower visual-field. This pattern of 
mapping is congruent with the HIGH PITCH IS UP conceptual metaphor. As the 
short SOA was 500ms, which is relatively long in terms of processing time, no claims 
can be made about the automaticity of the HIGH PITCH IS UP conceptual metaphor. 
However, in Studies 3 and 4 the short SOA will be 400ms, allowing investigation of 
automaticity. 
 
Figure 2. Release times for high- and low-tone trials for upper and lower visual-field 
targets in Study 1. 
 
There was also a main effect of SOA such that participants were faster to 
release on detection of a target in the 1200ms SOA trials (M = 448ms SD = 83ms) 
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than in the 500ms SOA trials (M = 471ms, SD = 101ms), F(1, 19) = 11.380, MSE = 
1921, p = .003, ηp2 = .375.  
Press Times 
 The median press times were analysed in a 2 (SOA: 500ms, 1200ms) x 2 
(Tone: low, high) x 2 (Visual-field: upper, lower) repeated-measures ANOVA. In 
contrast to the release times there was no significant tone x visual-field interaction, 
F(1, 19) = 1.009, MSE = 6288, p = .328, ηp2 = .050. The only significant effect was a 
main effect of SOA, such that participants were faster to identify a target on the 
1200ms SOA trials (M = 787ms, SD = 211ms) than on the 500ms SOA trials (M = 
872ms, SD = 255ms), F(1, 19) = 25.482, MSE = 11346, p < .001, ηp2 = .573.  
Movement Times 
The predicted tone x visual-field interaction was only observed for release 
responses. Participants were instructed to release the 5 key as soon as they detected a 
shape even if they had not identified it yet. The release and press times were recorded 
from the onset of the shape. To rule out any opposing effects present in the release 
and press times, movement time was calculated for the lag between the release 
response and the press response and the SOA x tone x visual-field ANOVA was 
repeated for the movement times. As in the press times there were no interactions and 
the only main effect was of SOA, F(1, 19) = 12.933, MSE = 9795, p = .002, ηp2 = 
.405; with faster movements at the long SOA (M = 323, SD = 186) than at the short 
SOA (M = 379, SD = 223). 
That the same main effect and no interactions were obtained in both the press 
and movement times indicates that there were not any effects in the press times that 
were cancelled out by the release times. The movement time analysis also 
demonstrated that the lag between releasing and pressing keys was short, often less 
than 100ms. As mentioned in the introduction, SRC mappings could mask conceptual 
metaphoric consistent shifts in attention in the press and movement times. Thus, it is 
not surprising that, if conceptual metaphoric shifts in attention are observed in only 
one reaction time variable, they are observed in the release times. The release times 
should be free of any confounding SRC mapping influence. Furthermore, Brookshire 
et al. (2010) state that movement times tap action execution rather than action 
planning. Thus it is primarily the release times, and secondly the press times, that are 
of theoretical interest and in Studies 3 and 4 the movement times will not be analysed.  
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Participants were faster to make both detection (indexed by the release time) 
and identification (indexed by the press and movement times) responses to shapes for 
trials with a long SOA than a short SOA. The psychological refractory period (PRP) 
effect could account for this long SOA advantage (Pashler, 1992; 1993). At the short 
SOA participants may have been delayed at selecting their response to the shape until 
they had selected their response to the word. The long SOA advantage observed in 
Study 1 thus suggests that even though participants were not required to respond to 
the tones until after the shape task, they were most probably evaluating and selecting 
their tone-identification response before they responded to the shapes. A strength of 
the current paradigm is that the long SOA advantage can be used as a marker of the 
evaluation process.  
The presence of a significant tone x visual-field interaction in the predicted 
direction in the release times combined with evidence of a PRP effect suggests that 
the paradigm is sensitive to attentional manipulation and is suitable for investigating 
auditorally induced verticality mappings.    
STUDY 2 
 The purpose of Study 2 was to investigate and control the psycholinguistic 
properties of the stimuli used in Studies 3 and 4. Studies 3 and 4 are similar in 
structure to Study 1. The experiments differ in the nature of the auditory stimuli. In 
Study 3, the auditory cues were semantically positive, negative, and neutral words, 
spoken in neutral prosody; which allows investigation of attentional shifts when 
processing emotional semantics. In Study 4, the auditory cues were semantically 
neutral words spoken in happy, sad, and neutral prosody; which allows investigation 
of attentional shifts when processing emotional prosody.  
 Studies 3 and 4 combined required 160 words for the target present trials: 96 
semantically-neutral words, 32 positive words, and 32 negative words. Thirty-two of 
the neutral words needed to be spoken in neutral prosody, 32 in happy prosody and 32 
in sad prosody. The positive and negative words needed to be spoken in only neutral 
prosody. Ratings for semantic emotion were taken from the Affective Norms of 
English words (ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 1999); however, it was necessary to conduct 
a ratings experiment to assess evaluation of prosodic emotion. An initial pool of 250 
words (50 positive words spoken in neutral prosody, 50 negative words spoken in 
neutral prosody, 50 neutral words spoken in neutral prosody, 50 neutral words spoken 
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in happy prosody, and 50 neutral words spoken in sad prosody3) were included in a 
prosodic ratings experiment to select the final 160 words. 
Method 
Participants 
 Twenty participants (4 male, 16 female; mean age 27.00 years), who did not 
participate in other studies, completed the prosodic identification component of this 
study. 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
The words were drawn from the ANEW (Bradley & Lang, 1999) and were 
spoken by an adult female voice actress. The prosodies were recorded in blocks to 
enhance consistency. The digital stimuli were recorded in one channel (mono) with a 
Neumann U87 microphone at 24bits and 44100Hz using the software Protools version 
7, controlled by a Macintosh G5 computer. The editing software Audacity version 
1.2.6 was used to duplicate the mono recordings to make stereo tokens, convert the 
files to 16bits, add 40ms of silence to the beginning of each word, and to equate the 
tokens for peak amplitude. 
Procedure 
Each participant identified the prosody of 150 tokens: 25 positive words 
spoken in neutral prosody, 25 negative words spoken in neutral prosody, 25 neutral 
words spoken in happy prosody, 25 neutral words spoken in sad prosody, 25 neutral 
words spoken in fearful prosody4, and 25 neutral words spoken in neutral prosody. 
Each of the tokens was a unique word for each participant, that is, they heard each 
individual word only once, in one of the four prosodies. As there were 20 participants, 
overall each token was identified by ten individuals. Participants were instructed to 
listen to the word, ignore the meaning, and click on the box that best described the 
tone of voice. The emotions participants could select from were: angry, fearful, sad, 
happy, neutral, and other. In order to exclude poor tokens, participants were also 
instructed to click a box labelled “could not hear” if they could not understand the 
word. For each word an identification score was calculated: the percentage of times 
participants identified the prosody as the valence intended by the voice actress.  
 
 
                                                
3 The neutral words spoken in sad prosody were also spoken in fearful prosody for use in another study.  
4For use in another study, not reported here. 
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Results and Discussion 
Prosodic Properties 
The 250 words identified in the prosodic identification experiment were 
narrowed down to 160 words and assigned to lists. The final 160 words were 
identified as their intended prosody by at least 70 percent of participants. Seventy 
percent is in the high range for identification of emotional prosody. Accuracy of 
prosodic identification is roughly 50 percent in most studies, which is well above 
chance, given the number of prosodies from which to choose (see Banse & Scherer, 
1996).  
See Table 2 for the prosodic identification scores for each list type. The 
properties of the words reported here are for the lists used for the target-present trials 
in Studies 3 and 4. There were two lists from which words would be drawn from for 
Study 3: the positive-semantics list (32 semantically positive words spoken in neutral 
prosody) and the negative-semantics list (32 semantically negative words spoken in 
neutral prosody). There were two lists from which words would be drawn from for 
Study 4: the happy-prosody list (32 semantically neutral words spoken in happy 
prosody) and the sad-prosody list (32 semantically neutral words spoken in sad 
prosody). Finally one list was for use in Studies 3 and 4: the neutral list (32 
semantically neutral words, spoken in neutral prosody). None of the final 160 words 
had any reports of not being able to hear what the word said. See Appendix A for the 
word lists. 
Acoustic Properties  
Acoustic analysis of the stimuli was also conducted. The characteristics of 
duration and pitch were selected. Duration was measured in ms (excluding the 40ms 
of silence at the beginning of each of the files). The Fundamental Frequency (F0) 
parameters mean, median, and standard deviation were extracted using PRAAT 
(Boersma & Weenink, 2007). Values between 75 and 600Hz were submitted to the 
auto-correlation method and used for the extraction of the F0. See Table 2 for a 
summary of the acoustic parameters for each of the five stimulus sets.  
Multivariate ANOVAs for the three prosodically-neutral lists to be used in 
Study 3 showed that the lists only differed on F0 standard deviation F(2, 93) = 8.059, 
MSE = 150, p = .001, ηp2 = .148, and duration F(2, 93) = 18.660, MSE = 12613, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .286. The lists did not differ on F0 mean or median. Post-hoc Tukey Tests 
showed that for F0 standard deviation, semantically-negative words had less within 
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word variation than positive (p = .006) and neutral words (p = .001), which did not 
differ from each other (p = .831). For duration, the post-hoc Tukey tests showed that 
semantically-positive words were longer than negative (p <.001) and neutral words (p 
= .001), which did not differ from each other (p = .082). Semantically-negative words 
were thus shorter in duration and were spoken in a neutral prosody that had less 
variance than semantically-positive and neutral words, but did not differ from 
semantically-positive or neutral words in mean or median pitch.  
Multivariate ANOVAs for the three semantically-neutral lists to be used in 
Study 4 showed that the lists differed on F0 mean, F(2, 93) = 50.948, MSE = 1729, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .523, F0 median, F(2, 93) = 33.081, MSE = 2456, p < .001, ηp2 = .416, 
F0 standard deviation F(2, 93) = 38.167, MSE = 752, p < .001, ηp2 = .451, and 
duration F(2, 93) = 14.241, MSE = 12285, p < .001, ηp2 = .234. Post-hoc Tukey Tests 
showed that for F0 mean and median, happy prosody was the highest in pitch and 
neutral prosody was the lowest in pitch with sad at an intermediary level (mean F0: 
happy-neutral p < .001, happy-sad p < .001, neutral-sad p = 005; median F0: happy-
neutral p < .001, happy-sad p < .001, neutral-sad p = .037) Post-hoc Tukey tests 
showed that for F0 standard deviation, happy prosody had the greatest within-word 
variation (happy-neutral p < .001, happy-sad p < .001), and that neutral and sad did 
not differ significantly from each other (p = .551). Post-hoc Tukey tests showed that 
for duration (ms), sad prosodic words were the slowest, and happy prosodic words the 
fastest, with neutral at an intermediary level (happy-neutral p = .012, happy-sad p < 
.001, neutral-sad p = .049). 
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Table 2.  
Prosodic and acoustic properties of the words used in Studies 3 and 4. 
 Semantically Emotional  Prosodically Emotional 
Property Positive-
semantics 
List 
M (SD) 
Negative-
semantics 
List  
M (SD) 
Neutral 
List 
 
M (SD) 
Happy-
prosody 
List 
M (SD) 
Sad-prosody 
List 
 
M (SD) 
 Prosodic Properties 
Prosodic 
identification 
percentage 
94.37 
(7.59) 
94.69 
(9.15) 
95.31 
(7.61) 
97.19 
(6.83) 
93.44 
(10.04) 
 Acoustic Properties 
F0 Mean 
(Hz) 
180 
(10) 
197 
(82) 
185eg 
(17) 
288ef 
(58) 
219fg 
(39) 
F0 Median 
(Hz) 
178 
(10) 
182 
(12) 
184hj 
(24) 
283hi 
(74) 
215ij 
(37) 
F0 Standard 
Deviation 
(Hz) 
25a 
(17) 
15ab 
(8) 
27bj 
(10) 
82jk 
(27) 
34k 
(38) 
Duration 
(ms) 
762cd 
(129) 
593c 
(114) 
654dln 
(91) 
573lm 
(125) 
720mn 
(113) 
Note. a-n indicate statistically significant differences within the property.
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Semantic and Lexical Properties 
In contrast to previous conceptual metaphor experiments (e.g. Brookshire et 
al., 2010; Meier & Robinson, 2004), the words in this experiment were highly 
controlled for lexical variables. The final word lists for the target-present trials were 
balanced for the semantic properties valence and arousal (both retrieved from the 
ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 1999); the lexical properties of length, frequency (Kucera-
Francis, 1967), imageability, familiarity, and concreteness (all three drawn from the 
MRC Psycholinguistics Database; Coltheart, 1981; Wilson, 1988), and orthographic 
neighbourhood size, phonological neighbourhood size, and bigram frequency 
(Ortho_N, OG_N, BG_Mean; drawn from measures obtained from the English 
Lexicon project; Balota et al., 2007). It is important to control for such lexical 
variables because if GOOD IS UP congruent shifts in attention are observed with a 
non-controlled word set it would be impossible to know if certain items were driving 
the shifts in attention due to their lexical properties. Lexical properties have been 
demonstrated to affect lexical processing. For example concreteness (Levy-Drori & 
Henik, 2006), frequency (Navarrete, Basagni, Alario, & Costa, 2006; Whaley, 1978), 
and orthographic neighbourhood size (Samson & Pillon, 2004). See Table 3 for a 
summary of the semantic properties for each of the five stimulus sets, and see Table 4 
for a summary of the lexical properties for each of the five stimulus sets. 
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Table 3.  
Emotional-semantic properties of the words used in Studies 3 and 4. 
 Semantically Emotional  Prosodically Emotional 
Property Positive-
semantics 
List 
M (SD) 
Negative-
semantics 
List 
M (SD) 
Neutral 
List 
 
M (SD) 
Happy-
prosody 
List 
M (SD) 
Sad-
prosody 
List 
M (SD) 
 Valence 7.71a 
(.44) 
Range 
7.05-8.72 
1.99c 
(.35) 
Range 
1.25-2.74 
5.50ac 
(.48) 
Range 
4.51-6.45 
5.40 
(.30) 
Range 
5.05-6.02 
5.54 
(.51) 
Range 
4.02-6.68 
Arousal 5.49b 
(1.41) 
5.77d 
(.90) 
4.06bd 
(.64) 
3.89 
(.55) 
4.06 
(.60) 
Note 1. a- d indicate statistically significant differences within the property, p < .005. 
Note 2. The valence ratings on the ANEW range from 1 (negative) to 9 (positive) and 
the arousal ratings on the ANEW range from 1 (low arousal) to 9 (high arousal). 
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Table 4.  
Lexical properties of the words used in Studies 3 and 4. 
 Semantically Emotional  Prosodically Emotional 
Property Positive-
semantics 
List 
M (SD) 
Negative-
semantics 
List 
M (SD) 
Neutral 
List 
 
M (SD) 
Happy-
prosody 
List 
M (SD) 
Sad-
prosody 
List 
M (SD) 
Length (letter) 5.72 
(1.59) 
5.72  
(1.40) 
5.53 
(1.50) 
5.63 
(1.29) 
5.53 
(1.32) 
Frequency 65 
(69) 
43 
(84) 
65 
(79) 
53 
(60) 
99 
(127) 
Familiarity 557a 
(44) 
510a 
(56) 
531 
(53) 
535 
(58) 
557 
(46) 
Concreteness 403b 
(122) 
418c 
(98) 
527bc 
(108) 
540 
(85) 
530 
(105) 
Imageability 500 
(89) 
500 
(61) 
534 
(97) 
541 
(88) 
552 
(86) 
Orthographic 
neighbourhood 
size 
4.34 
(5.78) 
3.72 
(6.03) 
4.50 
(6.32) 
4.03 
(4.88) 
5.22 
(5.03) 
Phonological 
neighbourhood 
size 
7.50 
(8.22) 
7.50 
(10.80) 
8.13 
(10.07) 
8.81 
(8.89) 
8.53 
(8.86) 
Bigram 
Frequency 
3180 
(1460) 
3537 
(1288) 
3615 
(1249) 
3863 
(1562) 
3743 
(1641) 
Note. a- c indicate statistically significant differences within the property, p < .005.
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Paired samples t-tests with a Bonferroni corrected alpha level of p = .005 were 
conducted to compare the emotional and lexical properties of the semantically 
positive, negative, and neutral words used in Study 3. Emotionally, the positive-
semantics and negative-semantics lists differed significantly on valence, t(62) = 
57.647, p < .001. The positive-semantics and neutral lists differed significantly on 
valence, t(62) = 19.192, p < .001, and arousal, t(62) = 5.249, p < .001. The negative-
semantics and neutral lists differed significantly on valence t(62) = -33.569, p < .001, 
and arousal, t(62) = 8.744, p < .001. Positive words were more positive than negative 
and neutral words, negative words were more negative than positive and neutral 
words, and positive and negative words were higher in arousal than neutral words. 
That is, the word types used in Study 3 differed as expected in terms of emotional 
semantics.  
The positive-semantics and negative semantics lists differed lexically. Positive 
words were more familiar than negative words, t(62) = 3.713, p < .001, and positive 
words were more concrete than negative words, t(62) = -4.291, p < .001. The 
negative-semantics and neutral lists differed significantly on concreteness t(62) = -
4.223, p < .001. Negative words were less concrete. It is not desirable that the positive 
words were more familiar than the negative words, or that neutral words were more 
concrete than the positive and negative words. While every possible effort was made 
to the balance the lists on these properties, it seems to be the nature of neutral words 
to be concrete, and positive words to be more familiar. However, these two variables 
should not influence any emotion-verticality mappings. In terms of concreteness, the 
neutral list is the baseline. The positive-semantics and negative-semantics lists do not 
differ on concreteness; and the positive-negative comparison is where any shifts to 
upper or lower space should be seen. The positive and negative emotional lists do 
however differ on familiarity. If familiarity results in greater activation of emotion 
verticality mappings then greater shifts in attention should be observed for positive 
words. The role of concreteness and familiarity in the results of Study 3 will be 
addressed in the discussion of Study 3. 
Paired samples t-tests with a Bonferroni corrected alpha level of p = .005 were 
conducted to compare the emotional and lexical properties of the semantically neutral 
words used in Study 4. The three semantically neutral lists to be used in Study 4 
(happy-prosody, sad-prosody, neutral) did not differ significantly from each other on 
any of the semantic or lexical variables. Aside from the concreteness and familiarity 
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differences in the emotional semantics lists to be used in Study 3, the words selected 
are well controlled and balanced. Therefore, they are suitable for a stringent test of the 
GOOD IS UP metaphor. 
STUDY 3: EMOTIONAL SEMANTICS 
 The aim of Study 3 was to determine if GOOD IS UP consistent shifts in 
attention are induced by spoken words that are semantically-emotional but not 
prosodically-emotional. The auditory cues were semantically negative, neutral, and 
positive words, spoken in neutral prosody. If processing of emotional semantics alone 
recruits emotion-verticality mappings, as seemingly demonstrated by studies that use 
written emotion words (Brookshire et al., 2010; Meier & Robinson, 2004), then 
participants’ attention should be directed to GOOD IS UP metaphorically congruent 
space. Participants should be faster to respond to targets in the upper visual-field than 
the lower visual-field after evaluating positive words, and faster to respond to targets 
in the lower visual-field than the upper visual-field after evaluating negative words.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 32 (29 female, 3 male; mean age 20.41 years) undergraduate 
students. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, had no hearing deficits, were 
right handed (as assessed by the Waterloo Handedness Questionnaire–Revised; Elias 
et al., 1998), and were in the sub-clinical range (participants scored no greater than 52 
out of 80) on anxiety and depression (as assessed by the Zung Anxiety, 1965, and 
Depression Questionnaires, 1971). 
Stimuli and Apparatus  
 See Studies 1 and 2 for details of the computer set up and stimuli used. 
Procedure 
As in Study 1, the participants completed a dual-task experiment. Participants 
performed a visual-attention task and a meaning-evaluation task. Specifically, 
participants heard a word, and then saw a shape. Participants were required first to 
make a speeded detection and identification response to the shape and subsequently a 
non-speeded evaluation of the word. Catch trials were included in which no shape was 
presented to ensure that participants did not anticipate their response to the target. 
The specific details of the procedure are mostly the same as in Study 1. There 
are four exceptions. First, instead of tones participants heard semantically-emotional 
words spoken in a neutral prosody. Thus, instead of tone identification, there was a 
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meaning-evaluation component which required participants to evaluate the meaning 
of the word they heard as negative, neutral, or positive by clicking on the 
corresponding box. The words ranged from 393 - 1013ms in length. Second, instead 
of two tone types (high, low) there were three word valences (negative, neutral, 
positive). As in Study 1, there were 96 critical trials and 24 catch trials. Therefore for 
the critical trials there were 32 trials that presented a negative word, 32 that presented 
a neutral word, and 32 that presented a positive word. Of the 32 critical trials, for each 
valence half (16) were presented with a short SOA (400ms) between the word and the 
visual target and half with a long SOA (1200ms). Of these half (8) had an upper 
visual-field target, half a lower visual-field target. Of these half (4 trials) presented a 
shape in the high-upper/lower position and half in the medium-upper/lower position. 
See the method section of Study 1 for visual angles. Half of the time the target was a 
circle, and half of the time a square. At the analysis stage the data was collapsed 
across high/low and medium location and shape type to give a score for the upper and 
lower visual-field with eight trials per condition. See Figure 3 for a visual illustration 
of the target-present trial makeup. 
 
32 positive   32 negative   32 neutral 
16 short SOA  16 long SOA 
  8 upper VF   8 lower VF 
 4 high upper VF 4 medium upper VF 
 2 square 2 circle 
Figure 3. Target-present trials in Study 3. 
 
 SOA was manipulated across items; each item was allocated one SOA. Third, 
to allow assessment of activation of the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor at 
automatic processing stages, the short SOA was reduced to 400ms from the 500ms 
used in Study 1. The word lists were ordered alphabetically and every second word 
was assigned the 400ms SOA, and alternating words the 1200ms SOA. As the words 
ranged from 313 - 1013ms in duration, on some trials the shape could appear while 
the word was still being presented. See Figure 4 for an illustration of the target-
present trial procedure. 
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Figure 4. Target-present trial procedure in Study 3. 
 
As in Study 1, reaction times for releases and presses from the onset of the 
shape were recorded using E-Prime and the computer’s internal timer. In order to 
control for possible response mapping influences, the assignment of shape to key 
(square, circle; 4, 6) was counterbalanced across participants. 
Before the 120 experimental trials, participants were given similar training as 
in Study 1. The fourth difference between Study 1 and 3 is that the number of practice 
trials was slightly increased to allow for even numbers of practice trials for each 
valenced word type. First, the participants completed twelve semantic-evaluation 
practice trials on which they only heard a word (four negative, neutral, and positive 
words) and evaluated the meaning they heard. They were given feedback on their 
meaning evaluation to help them understand the task demands. However, they were 
also instructed that there is individual variation in what people judge as positive and 
negative, and to respond with their own evaluation. Second, they completed twelve 
release-practice trials on which they might see a shape (four square, four circle, four 
catch) and released the 5 key upon seeing it. Third, they completed twelve press-
practice trials on which they might see a shape (four square, four circle, and four 
catch trials) and released the 5 key upon seeing it and identified it by pressing the 4 or 
6 key. For the second and third set of practice trials it was made clear to the 
participants that they should only release and press keys with their right index finger 
Fixation: Optional to make 400 or 
1200ms SOA 
 
	  
	  
+	  
	  
	  
+	  
Fixation: 1000ms-1500ms	  
Auditory Cue: Negative, neutral, 
or positive word 
393-1013ms 
393-1013ms 
 	  
	  
+	  
Visual Target: Release 
and press  
Up to 4000ms 
 
 
 
 Negative	   Neutral	   Positive Identify auditory cue  
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(i.e. not the middle or ring fingers). Fourth, they completed twelve practice trials with 
all trial components. 
Results and Discussion 
In contrast to Study 1, the evaluation component of the task did not have an 
objectively correct answer. In Study 3, participants were required to evaluate the 
meaning of the words. The “correct” answer was defined by using the ANEW ratings 
(Bradley & Lang, 1999). An examination of the answers given by participants for the 
target-present trials showed that the participants generally agreed with these ratings 
(M = 91%, SD = 5%). However, a closer look showed that participants agreed with 
the ANEW ratings more for negative words (M = 98%, SD = 2%) than for neutral 
words (M = 85%, SD = 13%); t(27) = 5.306, p < .001, or positive words (M = 90%, 
SD = 9%); t(27) = 5.116, p < .001. There was no significant difference between 
agreement for neutral and positive semantics; t(27) = -1.475, p = .152. Meaning is 
much more subjective than tones that differ consistently by 1500Hz (Study 1). In fact 
the conceptual-metaphor literature stresses that evaluation, or at least salience of 
meaning, is necessary to induce conceptual metaphoric mappings (Brookshire et al., 
2010; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Meier & Robinson, 2004). Thus, as in Experiment 3 
in Crawford et al. (2006), all subject analyses were conducted using the answer 
participants provided for the meaning evaluation rather than the predetermined 
ANEW meaning.  
Four participants were removed from the analysis (see below), resulting in a 
sample of 28 participants5 (27 female, 1 male; mean age 18.79 years). There were two 
reaction time variables: the time to release the 5 key from the onset of the shape on 
detection of a target (release time) and the time to press the 4 or 6 key from the onset 
of the shape on identification of the shape (press time). As the key release component 
of the shape task was a go-no-go target detection task, the number of catch trials on 
which participants responded was inspected. Two participants responded on more 
than two (out of 24) catch trials and were removed from the analysis. Times below 
200ms were deemed anticipatory and times above 1500ms as prolonged detection. 
Therefore, the release times for the remaining participants were filtered so that only 
trials on which the release time was greater than 200ms and less than 1500ms were 
used to calculate a median release time for each SOA, evaluation, and visual-field 
                                                
5Meier and Robinson (2004) included 28 participants in their Study 2, which closely parallels the 
design of the current experiment. 
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combination. All participants had at least 93 trials (out of 96; maximum 3% data 
excluded) with which to calculate a median release time. 
The key press component of the shape task was a target discrimination task; 
participants were required to report whether they saw a square or a circle. The press 
times excluded trials on which participants identified the shape incorrectly and the 
press times were filtered so that only trials on which the press time was greater than 
200ms were used to calculate a median press time for each SOA, evaluation, and 
visual-field combination. All participants had at least 84 trials (out of 96; maximum 
12% data excluded) with which to calculate the median response times. Two 
participants were removed from the analysis for not meeting this criterion. See Table 
5 for a summary of the subject release and press times. 
Item analyses were also conducted. Unlike for the subject analysis, for the 
item analysis I had to use the averages for each item based on the ANEW determined 
semantics in order to classify the valence, not the actual evaluations given by 
participants (which varied for some items). Thus, there will be eight trials in each 
prosody x SOA x visual-field cell for the item analysis, but the number of trials in 
each evaluation x SOA x visual-field cell will vary in the subject analysis. The subject 
and item analyses will be reported together. F1 denotes the subject analysis with data 
by evaluation, F2 denotes the item analysis with data by ANEW determined 
semantics. See Table 6 for a summary of the item release and press times. 
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Table 5. 
Mean (SD) subject release and press times (ms) for Study 3 by SOA, evaluation, and 
visual-field. 
 Release Times 
 Short SOA Long SOA 
Evaluated 
Emotion 
Lower VF 
M (SD) 
Upper VF 
M (SD) 
Lower VF 
M (SD) 
Upper VF 
M (SD) 
Positive 522 
(109) 
516 
(127) 
461 
(95) 
475 
(99) 
Neutral 521 
(119) 
512 
(130) 
470 
(102) 
459 
(97) 
Negative 510 
(109) 
510 
(143) 
463 
(109) 
477 
(118) 
 Press Times 
 Lower VF Upper VF Lower VF Upper VF 
Positive 781 
(170) 
801 
(191) 
693 
(141) 
685 
(148) 
Neutral 765 
(155) 
756 
(170) 
687 
(131) 
703 
(170) 
Negative 802 
(200) 
772 
(198) 
689 
(149) 
698 
(124) 
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Table 6. 
Mean (SD) item release and press times (ms) for Study 3 by SOA, meaning, and 
visual-field. 
 Release Times 
 Short SOA Long SOA 
Semantic 
Emotion 
Lower VF 
M (SD) 
Upper VF 
M (SD) 
Lower VF 
M (SD) 
Upper VF 
M (SD) 
Positive 513 
(20) 
502 
(28) 
451 
(14) 
462 
(21) 
Neutral 504 
(24) 
491 
(14) 
458 
(25) 
443 
(28) 
Negative 508 
(18) 
486 
(33) 
451 
(26) 
459 
(17) 
 Press Times 
 Lower VF Upper VF Lower VF Upper VF 
Positive 765 
(44) 
746 
(24) 
679 
(44) 
658 
(34) 
Neutral 744 
(25) 
753 
(47) 
682 
(8) 
686 
(47) 
Negative 761 
(74) 
739 
(32) 
687 
(34) 
681 
(45) 
 
Release Times 
 The median release times were analysed in 2 (SOA: 400ms, 1200ms) x 3 
(Evaluation F1/Meaning F2: negative, neutral, positive) x 2 (Visual-field: upper, 
lower) repeated-measures ANOVA (F1) and univariate ANOVA (F2). Importantly, 
there was no significant evaluation x visual-field interaction, F1(2, 54) = 1.693, MSE 
= 1365, p = .194, ηp2 = .059, or meaning x visual-field interaction F2(2, 84) = .692, 
MSE = 532, p = .503, ηp2 = .016; nor was there a SOA x evaluation x visual-field 
interaction, F1(2, 54) = .507, MSE = 1753, p = .605, ηp2 = .018, or a SOA x meaning x 
visual-field interaction F2(2, 84) = 1.056, MSE = 532, p = .352, ηp2 = .025. See Figure 
5 for the subject data and Figure 6 for the item data.  
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Figure 5. Subject release times for negative, neutral, and positively evaluated trials 
for upper and lower visual-field targets at the short and long SOA in Study 3. 
 
 
Figure 6. Item release times for negative, neutral, and positive semantics for upper 
and lower visual-field targets at the short and long SOA in Study 3. 
 
51 
 
The only significant effect in the release times was of SOA. Participants were 
significantly faster to release a key on detecting a shape on the long SOA trials (F1 M 
= 467ms, SD = 98 ms; F2 M = 454 ms, SD = 22 ms) than on the short SOA trials (F1 
M = 515 ms, SD = 118 ms; F2 M = 501 ms, SD = 24 ms), F1(1, 27) = 35.856, MSE = 
5294, p < .001, ηp2 = .570, F2 (1, 84) = 97.873, MSE = 532, p < .001, ηp2 = .538.  
Press Times 
 The median press times were analysed in 2 (SOA: 400ms, 1200ms) x 3 
(Evaluation F1/Meaning F2: negative, neutral, positive) x 2 (Visual-field: upper, 
lower) repeated-measures ANOVA (F1) and univariate ANOVA (F2). Mirroring the 
release time data there was no significant evaluation x visual-field interaction, F1(2, 
54) = .332, MSE = 6632, p = .719, ηp2 = .012, or meaning x visual-field interaction F2 
(2, 84) = .919, MSE = 1701, p = .403, ηp2 = .021; nor was there a SOA x evaluation x 
visual-field interaction, F1(2, 54) = 1.981, MSE = 4286, p = .148, ηp2 = .068, or a SOA 
x meaning x visual-field interaction F2 (2, 84) = .147, MSE = 1701, p = .863, ηp2 = 
.003. See Figure 7 for the subject data and Figure 8 for the item data. 
 
 
Figure 7. Subject press times for negative, neutral, and positively evaluated trials for 
upper and lower visual-field targets at the short and long SOA in Study 3. 
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Figure 8. Item press times for negative, neutral, and positive semantics for upper and 
lower visual-field targets at the short and long SOA in Study 3. 
 
Again mirroring the release time data the only significant effect was of SOA 
such that participants were faster to identify a shape on the long SOA trials (F1 M = 
693 ms, SD = 134 ms; F2  M = 679 ms, SD = 37 ms) than on the short SOA trials (F1 
M = 779 ms, SD = 166 ms; F2 M = 751 ms, SD = 43 ms), F1(1, 27) = 54.129, MSE = 
11696, p <.001, ηp2 = .667, F2(1, 84) = 74.207, MSE = 1701, p <.001, ηp2 = .469.  
Contrary to the hypothesis, evaluation of meaning did not induce GOOD IS 
UP congruent shifts in visual attention There was no significant evaluation/meaning x 
visual-field or SOA x evaluation/meaning x visual-field interactions in the release or 
press times. Study 3 failed to replicate the results of Meier and Robinson (2004). 
Possible reasons for the lack of replication of the GOOD IS UP congruent shifts in 
attention with spoken language will be addressed in the General Discussion. 
As in Study 1, with high- and low-pitch tones, participants were faster to make 
both detection and identification responses to shapes for trials with a long SOA 
(1200ms) than a short SOA (400ms). This was evident at both the subject-evaluation 
and item-ANEW meaning levels. As discussed, the psychological refractory period 
(PRP) effect could account for this long SOA advantage. Participants cannot begin the 
response-selection process for the second stimulus (in this case the shape) until a 
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response has been selected, but not necessarily produced for the first stimulus (in this 
case the word).  Thus, the long SOA advantage observed in Study 3 suggests that 
even though participants were not required to evaluate the word until after the shape 
task, they were evaluating and selecting their response before they responded to the 
shapes. However, evaluation of meaning did not seem to activate perceptual shifts 
congruent with the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor. 
In Study 2, it was noted that the neutral words were more concrete than the 
positive and negative words, and that the positive words were more familiar than the 
neutral and negative words. It is unlikely that such differences could be masking any 
GOOD IS UP congruent shifts in attention. Rather, it would be expected that greater 
concreteness and familiarity would enhance any verticality-emotion mappings 
induced by processing the neutral and positive words respectively. That is, higher 
concreteness and familiarity could enhance, or indeed be the result of, a stronger link 
between the perceptuomotor source domain, verticality, and the conceptual target 
domain, emotion. This is not the case. There was no difference between the upper and 
lower visual fields for any of the evaluated word types in the direction predicted by 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory for the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor.  
STUDY 4: EMOTIONAL PROSODY 
Study 4 is the converse of Study 3. The aim was to determine if GOOD IS UP 
congruent shifts in attention are induced by spoken words that are prosodically 
emotional but semantically neutral. The auditory cues were semantically neutral 
words, spoken in negative (sad), neutral, and positive (happy) prosodies. If processing 
of emotional prosody alone recruits GOOD IS UP mappings then participants’ 
attention should be shifted to metaphorically congruent space. Participants should be 
faster to respond to targets in the upper visual-field than in the lower visual-field after 
evaluating happy prosody, and faster to respond to targets in the lower visual-field 
than in the upper visual-field after evaluating sad prosody.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 38 (27 female, 11 male; mean age 20.24 years) 
undergraduate students. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, had no hearing 
deficits, were right handed (as assessed by the Waterloo Handedness Questionnaire–
Revised; Elias et al., 1998), and were in the sub-clinical range (not greater than 56 out 
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of 80) on anxiety or depression (as assessed by the Zung Anxiety, 1965, and 
Depression Questionnaires, 1971). 
Stimuli and Apparatus  
 See Studies 1, 2, and 3 for details of the computer set up and stimuli used. 
Procedure 
As in Studies 1 and 3, the participants completed a dual-task paradigm. 
Participants performed a visual-attention task and a prosodic-evaluation task. 
Specifically on critical trials, participants heard a word, and then saw a shape. They 
were first required to make a speeded detection and identification response to the 
shape and subsequently a non-speeded evaluation of the prosody. Catch trials were 
included in which no shape was presented. 
The specific details of the procedure were almost identical to Study 3. There 
are three exceptions. First, instead of semantically-emotional words spoken in neutral 
prosody, participants heard semantically-neutral words spoken in emotional prosody. 
The tokens ranged from 407 - 1047ms in length. Second, instead of meaning 
evaluation, there was a prosodic-evaluation component which required participants to 
evaluate the prosody of the word they heard as sad, neutral, or happy by clicking on 
the corresponding box.  Third, in the practice trials, participants practiced evaluating 
the valence of the prosody. The break-down of trial numbers by prosodic valence, 
SOA, shape position, and shape type was the same as in Study 3. See Figure 9 for an 
illustration of the target-present trial procedure. 
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Figure 9. Target-present trial procedure in Study 4. 
 
Results and Discussion 
As in Study 3, the evaluation component of the task did not have an 
objectively correct answer. The “correct” answer was defined as the prosody the 
majority of participants in Study 2 identified the token as being spoken in. 
Participants generally agreed with the identification (M = 92%, SD = 6%), although 
there was higher agreement for the happy prosody (M = 95%, SD = 7%) versus the 
sad prosody (M = 89%, SD = 10%), t(27) = -3.567, p = .001. Neutral prosodic 
agreement (M = 91%, SD = 7%) did not differ from happy or sad. To be consistent 
with the subject analyses conducted in Study 3, all subject analyses were conducted 
using the answer participants gave for the prosodic evaluation rather than the 
consensus identification.  
Ten participants were removed from the analysis (see below), resulting in a 
sample of 28 participants (20 female, 8 male; mean age 20.64 years)6. As in Study 3, 
there were two reaction time variables: the time to release the 5 key on detection of a 
target (release time); and the time to press the 4 or 6 key for identification of the 
shape (press time). As the key release component of the shape task was a go-no-go 
target detection task, the number of catch trials on which participants responded was 
inspected. Seven participants responded on more than two (out of 24) catch trials and 
                                                
6Twenty-eight is the same number of participants as in Study 3, and in Meier and Robinson’s (2004) 
Study 2. 
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were removed from the analysis. Times below 200ms were deemed anticipatory and 
times above 1500ms as prolonged detection. Therefore, the release times for the 
remaining participants were filtered so that only trials on which the release time was 
greater than 200ms and less than 1500ms were used to calculate a median release time 
for each SOA, evaluation, and visual-field combination. All participants had at least 
91 trials (out of 96; maximum 5% data excluded) with which to calculate a median 
release time. 
The key press component of the shape task was a target discrimination task; 
participants were required to report whether they saw a square or a circle. The press 
times excluded trials on which participants identified the shape incorrectly and were 
filtered so that only trials on which the press time was greater than 200ms were used 
to calculate a median press time for each SOA, prosody, and visual-field combination. 
All participants had at least 83 trials (out of 96; maximum 14% data excluded) with 
which to calculate the median press times. Three participants were removed from the 
analysis for not meeting this criterion. See Table 7 for a summary of the subject 
release and press times. 
Item analyses were also conducted. Unlike the subject analysis, the item 
analysis used the averages for each item based on the consensus prosody from Study 2 
in order to classify the valence, not the actual evaluations given by participants. The 
subject and item analyses will be reported together. F1 denotes the subject analysis 
with data by evaluation, F2 denotes the item analysis with data by consensus. See 
Table 8 for a summary of the item release and press times. 
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Table 7. 
Mean (SD) subject release and press times (ms) for Study 4 by SOA, prosody-
evaluation, and visual-field. 
 Release Times 
 Short SOA Long SOA 
Evaluated 
Prosody 
Lower VF 
M (SD) 
Upper VF 
M (SD) 
Lower VF 
M (SD) 
Upper VF 
M (SD) 
Happy 502 
(112) 
490 
(106) 
460 
(91) 
446 
(84) 
Neutral 517 
(109) 
504 
(109) 
459 
(87) 
460 
(81) 
Sad 528 
(115) 
513 
(92) 
442 
(68) 
459 
(89) 
 Press Times 
 Lower VF Upper VF Lower VF Upper VF 
Happy 829 
(231) 
822 
(213) 
733 
(178) 
753 
(196) 
Neutral 894 
(300) 
810 
(228) 
746 
(170) 
798 
(223) 
Sad 856 
(222) 
853 
(249) 
748 
(197) 
728 
(175) 
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Table 8. 
Mean (SD) item release and press times (ms) for Study 4 SOA, consensus-prosody, 
and visual-field. 
 Release Times 
 Short SOA Long SOA 
Consensus 
Prosody 
Lower VF 
M (SD) 
Upper VF 
M (SD) 
Lower VF 
M (SD) 
Upper VF 
M (SD) 
Happy 485 
(30) 
494 
(31) 
465 
(30) 
445 
(15) 
Neutral 510 
(27) 
494 
(30) 
450 
(11) 
453 
(28) 
Sad 508 
(28) 
514 
(44) 
443 
(21) 
451 
(16) 
 Press Times 
 Lower VF Upper VF Lower VF Upper VF 
Happy 783 
(58) 
753 
(29) 
708 
(35) 
709 
(19) 
Neutral 837 
(99) 
785 
(36) 
712 
(52) 
740 
(39) 
Sad 822 
(63) 
817 
(89) 
704 
(32) 
703 
(35) 
 
Release Times 
 The median release times were analysed in a 2 (SOA: 400ms, 1200ms) x 3 
(Evaluation F1/Consensus F2: negative, neutral, positive) x 2 (Visual-field: upper, 
lower) repeated-measures ANOVA (F1) and univariate ANOVA (F2). There was no 
evaluation x visual-field interaction F1(2, 54) = .727, MSE = 1769, p = .488, ηp2 = 
.026, or a consensus x visual-field interaction F2(2, 84) = .608, MSE = 741, p = .547, 
ηp2 = .014, nor was there a SOA x evaluation x visual-field interaction F1(2, 54) = 
1.353, MSE = 1463, p = .267, ηp2 = .048, or a SOA x consensus x visual-field 
interaction F2(2, 84) = 1.630, MSE = 741, p = .202, ηp2 = .037. See Figures 10 and 11 
for the subject and item data displayed by SOA, valence, and visual-field. 
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Figure 10. Subject release times for trials evaluated as sad, neutral, and happy for 
upper and lower visual-field targets at the short and long SOA in Study 4. 
 
 
Figure 11. Item release times for sad, neutral, and happy prosody for upper and lower 
visual-field targets at the short and long SOA in Study 4. 
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There was a significant effect of SOA at both the subject and item level. 
Participants were significantly faster to release a key on detecting a shape on the long 
SOA trials (F1 M = 452ms, SD = 76ms; F2 M = 451ms, SD = 21ms) than on the short 
SOA trials (F1 M = 504ms, SD = 94ms; F2 M = 501ms, SD = 32ms), F1(1, 27) = 
34.183, MSE = 7433, p < .001, ηp2 = .559, F2 (1, 84) = 79.526, MSE = 741, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .486.  
The main effect of SOA was qualified by both evaluation and visual-field. 
These two interactions were significant at the subject level but not the item level. 
First, there was a SOA x evaluation interaction F1(2, 54) = 4.681, MSE = 1127, p = 
.013, ηp2 = .148, see Figure 12, but not a SOA x consensus interaction F2(2, 84) = 
2.303, MSE = 741, p = .106, ηp2 = .052. In the subject data the SOA x evaluation 
interaction was driven by a difference in release times at the short SOA. Participants 
were significantly faster to release on detection of a target on short SOA trials where 
they evaluated the prosody as happy (M = 491 ms, SD = 96 ms) than as sad (M = 518 
ms, SD = 94 ms), t(27) = 3.218, p = .003, or neutral (M = 510 ms, SD = 103 ms) t(27) 
= 2.395, p = .024. This facilitation of release times for short SOA trials on which the 
prosody was evaluated as happy could be due to the PRP effect. Participants were 
more likely to agree with the prosodic identification scores from Study 2 for happy 
prosody than sad prosody. If prosodic-evaluation consensus (see Table 5) is taken as 
an index of ease of prosodic-evaluation response selection under dual-task conditions, 
then participants found the evaluation component easier for words spoken in happy 
prosody. This could have lead to a reduction in the time needed to select the 
evaluation response for happy trials, which would have reduced the cognitive-
bottleneck at response selection for task 1 (prosodic evaluation) and resulted in 
quicker release times for task 2 (shape detection). Importantly, the SOA x evaluation 
interaction was not qualified by visual-field, and is not evidence of GOOD IS UP 
congruent shifts in attention. 
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Figure 12. Subject release times by SOA and evaluation in Study 4.  
 
 Second, there was a SOA x visual-field interaction at the subject level F1(1, 
27) = 4.846, MSE = 887, p = .036, ηp2 = .152, see Figure 13, but not at the item level 
F2(1, 84) = .051, MSE = 741, p = .823, ηp2 = .001. Though neither comparison was 
significant, the interaction at the subject level was driven by different visual-field 
biases at the short and long SOA. At the short SOA participants were non-
significantly faster to respond to targets in the upper visual-field (M = 502 ms, SD = 
98 ms) than in the lower visual-field (M = 507 ms, SD = 93 ms), t(27) = .750, p = 
.460. At the long SOA participants were non-significantly faster to respond to targets 
in the lower-visual field (M = 451 ms, SD = 78 ms) than in the upper visual-field (M = 
454 ms, SD = 80 ms), t(27) = -.589, p = .561. Importantly, the SOA x visual-field 
interaction was not qualified by evaluation, and is not evidence of GOOD IS UP 
congruent shifts in attention. 
 As both the SOA x evaluation and SOA x visual-field interactions were 
significant at the subject but not at the item level, this suggests that the patterns of 
responding do not generalise well across items. 
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Figure 13.  Subject release times by SOA and visual-field in Study 4. 
 
Press Times 
The median press times were analysed in a 2 (SOA: 400ms, 1200ms) x 3 
(Evaluation F1/Prosody F2: negative, neutral, positive) x 2 (Visual-field: upper, lower) 
repeated-measures ANOVA (F1) and univariate ANOVA (F2). There was no 
evaluation x visual-field interaction F1(2, 54) = .503, MSE = 7893, p = .607, ηp2 = 
.018, or a prosody x visual-field interaction F2(2, 84) = .097, MSE = 2954, p = .907, 
ηp2 = .002, nor was there a SOA x evaluation x visual-field interaction F1(1.480, 
39.963) = 3.118, MSE = 18732, p = .069, ηp2 = .104 (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected)7, 
or a SOA x prosody x visual-field interaction F2(2, 84) = .979, MSE = 2954, p = .380, 
ηp2 = .023. See Figures 14 and 15 for the subject and item data displayed by SOA, 
valence, and visual-field. 
 
                                                
7That this interaction approaches significance is probably due to shifts in attention on trials evaluated as 
neutral at the short and long SOA, see Figure 14. At the short SOA there was an upper visual-field 
advantage and at the long SOA a lower visual-field advantage for trials evaluated as neutral prosody. 
This is not consistent with a GOOD IS UP shift in attention.  
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Figure 14. Subject press times for trials evaluated as sad, neutral, and happy prosody 
for upper and lower visual-field targets at the short and long SOA in Study 4. 
 
 
Figure 15. Item press times for sad, neutral, and happy prosody for upper and lower 
visual-field targets at the short and long SOA in Study 4. 
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There was a significant effect of SOA at both the subject and item level. 
Participants were significantly faster to press a key on identifying a shape at the long 
SOA (F1 M = 740 ms, SD = 181 ms; F2 M = 713, SD = 37) than at the short SOA (F1 
M = 826 ms, SD = 214 ms; F2 M = 800 ms, SD = 70 ms), F1(1, 27) = 47.117, MSE = 
15422, p < .001, ηp2 = .636, F2 (1, 84) = 61.503, MSE = 2893, p < .001, ηp2 = .423. 
The only other significant effect in the press times was that, as in the release 
times, the main effect of SOA was qualified by visual-field. While the SOA x visual-
field interaction was significant at the subject level, F1(1, 27) = 9.679, MSE = 5047, p 
= .004, ηp2 = .264 (see Figure 16), it was not significant at the item level, F2(1, 84) = 
2.895, MSE = 2954, p = .093, ηp2 = .033. The interaction at the subject level is driven 
by different visual-field biases at the short and long SOA. At the short SOA 
participants were significantly faster to identify targets in the upper visual-field (M = 
816, SD = 219) than in the lower visual-field (M = 841 ms, SD = 206 ms), t(27) = 
2.188, p = .037. At the long SOA participants were non-significantly faster to identify 
targets in the lower-visual field (M = 738 ms, SD = 177 ms) than in the upper visual-
field (M = 745, SD = 181), t(27) = -.674, p = .506. Importantly, as in the release times, 
the SOA x visual-field interaction was not qualified by evaluation, and is not 
suggestive of a GOOD IS UP congruent shift in attention. 
 
 
Figure 16. Subject press times by SOA and visual-field in Study 4. 
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Contrary to the hypothesis, evaluation of emotional-prosody did not induce 
shifts in visual attention consistent with the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor. There 
was no significant evaluation/prosody x visual-field or SOA x evaluation/prosody x 
visual-field interactions in the release or press times when examining data by subject 
or by item. Participants were not faster to respond to targets in the upper visual-field 
than in the lower visual-field after evaluating happy prosody, and were not faster to 
respond to targets in the lower visual-field than in the upper visual-field after 
evaluating sad prosody. Thus, Study 4 demonstrates that evaluation of prosodically 
emotional words does not seem to activate a GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor. The 
lack of shifts in attention in Study 3, with emotional semantics, and in Study 4, with 
emotional prosody, suggests that serious thought needs to be given as to whether a 
GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor is recruited to process emotional semantics or 
prosody in spoken language. 
As in Studies 1 and 3, participants were faster to make both detection and 
identification responses to shapes on trials with a long SOA than with a short SOA. 
As discussed, the psychological refractory period (PRP) effect could account for this 
long SOA advantage. Participants cannot begin the response-selection process for the 
second stimulus (in this case the shape) until a response has been selected, but not 
necessarily produced for the first stimulus (in this case the evaluation of the prosody).  
Thus, the long SOA advantage observed in Study 4 suggests that even though 
participants were not required to respond to the prosody until after the shape task, 
they were most probably evaluating it and selecting their response before they 
responded to the shape. The presence of a PRP effect in this paradigm is also 
supported by the SOA x evaluation interaction in the subject release-times. It appears 
that participants were facilitated on response-selection for the prosodic-evaluation 
task for happy-prosody, perhaps due to the greater salience or ease of processing of 
the happy-prosody, resulting in a reduction of the response-selection bottleneck, 
which was reflected in faster release times for the for happy-prosody trials at the short 
SOA.  
 In Study 4, there was also a significant SOA x visual-field interaction in the 
subject release and press times. Participants were biased to attend to the upper visual-
field at the short SOA, and to the lower visual-field at the long SOA. One explanation 
for this effect is that attention sweeps up and down, over the time course of evaluative 
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processing. It is important to note that the SOA x evaluation and the SOA x visual-
field interactions were only present at the subject level. Furthermore, the SOA x 
evaluation interaction was not qualified by visual-field and the SOA x visual-field 
interaction was not qualified by evaluation. Also note, that the SOA x evaluation and 
SOA x visual-field interactions were not consistent with activation of a GOOD IS UP 
conceptual metaphor and were not observed in Study 3 with semantically emotional 
spoken words. 
General Discussion 
If representation is achieved through conceptual metaphors, then activation of 
the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor should be required for the evaluation of 
emotional words, and metaphor congruent shifts in attention should be observed. In 
their 2004 study, Meier and Robinson reported GOOD IS UP congruent shifts in 
attention. Participants read written semantically positive and negative words, 
evaluated them, and then responded to a target in the upper or lower visual-field. 
Participants were faster to respond to targets in the upper visual-field than in the lower 
visual-field after evaluating positive words, and were faster to respond to targets in 
the lower visual-field than in the upper visual-field after evaluating negative words. 
Such shifts in attention suggest that processing emotional words activates a GOOD IS 
UP conceptual metaphoric representation. 
GOOD IS UP congruent shifts in attention were not replicated in this thesis 
with spoken emotional words. The paradigm required participants to listen to spoken 
words which were emotional in terms of their semantics or in terms of their prosody, 
then to detect and identify a visual target presented in the upper or lower visual-field, 
and then to evaluate the word. In Study 3, in which participants evaluated spoken 
semantically-positive and negative words, no shifts in attention were observed at the 
short (chosen to index automatic processing stages) or the long SOA (chosen to index 
controlled processing stages). Participants were not faster to detect targets in the 
upper visual-field than in the lower visual-field when evaluating words as 
semantically positive, and were not faster to detect targets in the lower visual-field 
than in the upper visual-field when evaluating words as semantically negative. In 
Study 4, in which participants evaluated happy and sad prosodies, no shifts in 
attention were observed at the short or the long SOA. Participants were not faster to 
detect targets in the upper visual-field than in the lower visual-field when evaluating 
prosody as happy, and were not faster to detect targets in the lower visual-field than in 
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the upper visual-field when evaluating prosody as sad. The lack of GOOD IS UP 
congruent shifts in attention at the short or long SOA is contrary to Meier and 
Robinson’s predictions of conceptual metaphor congruent perceptual processing and 
automaticity. 
If metaphor congruent shifts in attention are consistently not observed during 
spoken word processing, this would suggest that conceptual metaphor representation 
is not obligatory and a main prediction of Conceptual Metaphor Theory is violated. It 
is interesting that GOOD IS UP congruent shifts in attention, which seem to be robust 
when induced with written words (Brookshire et al., 2010; Casasanto, 2008, as cited 
in Brookshire et al., 2010; Meier & Hauser, 2008, as cited in Crawford, 2009; Meier 
& Robinson, 2004, 2006; Weger et al., 2007), were not observed with a paradigm 
using spoken words. Given the claim repeatedly made by grounded cognition theorists 
(e.g. Barsalou, 1999; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), that the evolutionarily older 
perceptuomotor system underlies representation, and given that spoken language is an 
evolutionarily older cognitive process than writing, it was expected that evidence of 
conceptual metaphoric representation should be easily observed in spoken language 
processing. Perhaps source-target domain mappings are not activated universally 
across language modalities. If that is the case, Conceptual Metaphor Theory needs to 
be revised. However, before addressing the theoretical issues raised by the use of 
spoken language, it is necessary to scrutinise the methodology used in this thesis. 
Methodology 
Unlikely methodological explanations. 
It is not likely that the paradigm used in this thesis was ill suited for assessing 
metaphoric shifts in attention. First, lack of statistical power is unlikely to have 
contributed to the failure to find GOOD IS UP congruent shifts in attention in Studies 
3 and 4. The number of participants was sufficient. Metaphor congruent shifts were 
observed in Study 1 with 20 participants and there were 28 participants in each of 
Studies 3 and 4; the same number of participants Meier and Robinson (2004) 
recruited for their Study 2, which mirrored the design in this thesis. There were fewer 
trials for each of the valences in Studies 3 and 4 (32 trials for each of positive/happy, 
neutral, and negative/sad) than for the two tone types in Study 1 (50 trials), however, 
32 is still a reasonably high trial count with which to calculate a mean reaction time. 
Although Meier and Robinson had trial counts of 50 for each of the positive and 
negative valences, GOOD IS UP congruent perceptual processing has been observed 
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with as few as 30 trials per valence type (see Crawford et al., 2006). Importantly, a 
visual inspection of the standard errors of the valence effect in Meier and Robinson’s 
Figure 2 revealed that the standard errors of the valence effect for Study 3 and 4 are 
smaller than theirs. Thus, the analyses reported in this thesis are in fact more powerful 
than those reported by Meier and Robinson.  
Second, it is evident in Study 1 that the paradigm used in this thesis was 
sensitive to metaphoric shifts in attention. The pattern of responding in the release 
times, when the cues were high and low tones, was congruent with the HIGH PITCH 
IS UP conceptual metaphor (e.g. Evans & Treisman, 2010). Participants were 
significantly faster to respond to targets in the upper visual-field than in the lower 
visual-field after identifying high pitched tones, and were non-significantly faster to 
respond to targets in the lower visual-field than in the upper visual-field after 
identifying low pitched tones. This indicates that the attention task was sensitive to 
metaphoric congruent shifts in attention.  
Third, although the data was analysed in such a way that the trial number in 
each cell was sometimes reduced, it is unlikely that the choice of data analysis 
masked any GOOD IS UP shifts in attention. Data was excluded at a trial level for 
each participant. A small number of trials were removed for the release times, a 
maximum of five percent in Study 4. Three percent was the highest proportion of 
trials for the release times removed for a participant in Study 1 and 3. Yet shifts in 
attention were observed in Study 1, but not in Study 3. A greater proportion of trials 
were removed for the press times. However, given the shifts in attention observed in 
the release times for Study 1 and the susceptibility of the press times to stimulus-
response compatibility effects, it was expected that if shifts in attention were induced 
they would be observed in the release times. In Studies 3 and 4 the data was examined 
by evaluation which may have resulted in some cells with a small number of trials. 
Importantly, metaphor congruent processing has been observed by Crawford et al. 
(2009) when analysing data by evaluation. Furthermore, in this thesis no shifts in 
attention were observed when the data was examined by item; and the item analyses 
kept the number of trials in each SOA x semantics/prosody x visual-field cell evenly 
at eight.  
As the statistical power is sufficient, the paradigm is sensitive to shifts in 
attention, and the choice of data analysis is unlikely to be masking shifts in attention, 
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the lack of GOOD IS UP congruent shifts in attention in this thesis seems to be 
reliable.  
Comparison to Meier and Robinson (2004). 
 In order to perform a more stringent test of Conceptual Metaphor Theory I 
made a number of changes from the paradigm used by Meier and Robinson (2004) in 
their Study 2. Although making a large number of design changes at once goes 
against conventional wisdom in experimental design, the goal was to eliminate as 
many potential confounds as possible, and conduct a clean set of studies. Identifying 
the change (or changes) that were potentially responsible for the difference in patterns 
of responding induced by written and spoken emotional words would help to identify 
the boundary conditions under which conceptual metaphors play a role in language 
processing. In fact, identifying the change (or changes) which resulted in the null 
results of this thesis may reveal that the shifts in attention observed in Meier and 
Robinson (2004) were artifactual. Most of these changes would not have been 
expected to eliminate the activation of the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor and 
associated perceptual processes. However, the possibility that these changes are 
important boundary conditions for observing GOOD IS UP congruent shifts in 
attention should be explored in future studies.  
First, the reversal of the order of the component tasks was changed. In Meier 
and Robinson (2004) participants evaluated the words immediately after their 
presentation, before the target was presented. The change in task component order 
was necessary to conduct a more stringent test of Meier and Robinson’s (2005) 
prediction of automaticity; that shifts in attention should be seen at automatic 
processing stages if representation is achieved with conceptual metaphors. Meier and 
Robinson’s (2004) design did not allow a robust test of the automaticity prediction. 
To allow controlled manipulation of SOA, in the current studies participants evaluated 
the words at the end of the trial, after a response was made to the visual target. 
Therefore it is possible that participants were not immediately evaluating the word but 
were delaying meaning access until after presentation of the target. If participants 
were delaying the evaluation process attentional shifts would not be observed.  
However, there is evidence that participants were evaluating the word when it 
was presented. Evaluation agreement was fairly high so comprehension must have 
taken place at some point in the trial. Furthermore, in studies 1, 3, and 4, participants 
were faster to respond to visual targets at the long SOA than at the short SOA. 
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Although the facilitation of response times for the shape task at the long SOA could 
be due to any number of reasons, it is consistent with a PRP explanation (a dual task 
bottleneck at response selection; Pashler, 1992, 1993), suggesting that participants 
had to select their evaluation response for stimulus one, the auditory cue, before 
selecting their response for stimulus two, the visual target. Presumably the same 
delaying strategy would have been present in Study 1. In Study 1 HIGH PITCH IS UP 
congruent attentional shifts were observed and a PRP effect was also present. Thus if 
the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor was recruited during spoken word processing, 
the timing of evaluation is probably not a critical boundary condition. To completely 
rule out evaluation timing as a boundary condition, a study should be conducted in 
which participants evaluate the spoken word immediately after it is presented. If the 
immediate evaluation of the spoken word is necessary to observe GOOD IS UP 
congruent shits in attention, GOOD IS UP shifts in attention should be observed with 
this design.  
Second, it is also worth considering the role that explicitly producing the 
words ‘positive' and ‘negative’ may have on activation of the GOOD IS UP 
conceptual metaphor. Meier and Robinson’s (2004) paradigm may have exaggerated 
the role that the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor plays in written word processing. 
In Meier and Robinson's (2004) study participants were required to say out loud their 
evaluation of the word. In the paradigm used in this thesis participants were required 
to click on the appropriate label; positive, negative, neutral in Study 3, and happy, 
sad, neutral in Study 4. Actively saying the word would have activated the motor 
program for positive and negative semantics which may on its own have resulted in 
feedback activation to the mapping between the source domain (verticality) and the 
target domain (valence), resulting in GOOD IS UP congruent shifts of attention. In 
fact the labels used by Meier and Robinson, positive and negative, are the target 
dimensions mapped to upper and lower space in the GOOD IS UP conceptual 
metaphor. Therefore the shifts in attention described by Meier and Robinson may be a 
result of the explicit vocal response, not the evaluation. However, Brookshire et al. 
(2010) did observe GOOD IS UP congruent shifts of attention with no explicit 
evaluation of the words, aloud or otherwise. Thus, if activation of motor programs 
does result in feedback activation to the conceptual metaphor system, this was 
probably not producing the totality of the effect.  
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The paradigm used in this thesis could be modified to test the contribution of 
explicit labelling using the positive and negative dimensions. Participants could 
complete the evaluation task using explicit naming instead of mouse clicks. Given the 
above comments on the timing of the evaluation component, two versions should be 
conducted, one where the spoken evaluation occurs immediately after presentation of 
the word and one where the spoken evaluation occurs at the end of each trial. If 
explicit production of the valence labels produces GOOD IS UP congruent shifts in 
attention, then shifts in attention should be observed with the use of a naming rather 
than mouse click response. In fact, if the change to a spoken response restores GOOD 
IS UP shifts in attention then a study should be conducted in which the task on each 
trial is to say aloud “positive” or “negative” before completing a visual attention 
component. This would allow pure assessment of the contribution of explicit valence 
label production to GOOD IS UP shifts in attention, without the confounding 
influence of an evaluation task. 
The most likely methodological reason I did not observe GOOD IS UP 
congruent shifts in attention in this thesis is the addition of neutral semantics and 
prosody to the task. Theoretically, the addition of neutral may have changed the 
experimental context (compared to Meier & Robinson, 2004) and thus this thesis may 
demonstrate the dependency of grounded cognition on context. 
Contextually dependent grounded cognition. 
 In this thesis the words used were only emotional in a maximum of one 
channel. The words could be semantically emotional or prosodically emotional, but 
were never both semantically and prosodically emotional. Neutral semantics and 
prosody were included for two reasons. First, I wished to look at the recruitment of 
the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor during processing of emotional semantics and 
emotional prosody separately. This entailed that one channel, either semantics or 
prosody, was neutral in each study. Second, naturalistic speech is not exclusively 
emotional. Generally, in emotional language research, words are selected which are 
very high in valence and arousal. It was thought that the inclusion of neutral stimuli 
would increase the ecological validity of the test of the cognitive reality of the GOOD 
IS UP conceptual metaphor in spoken language. Thus, a condition was included in 
Studies 3 and 4 in which semantically-neutral words were spoken in neutral prosody. 
 However, by including neutral semantics and prosody, the contrast between 
the two emotional valences used in each study was reduced, which could have 
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affected the degree to which conceptual metaphoric representations were activated. In 
the written GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor studies with only positive and negative 
words (e.g. Brookshire et al., 2010; Meier & Robinson, 2004, 2006) the valence of a 
word would have been very salient to the participant, and the evaluation required, 
positive or negative, would have been relatively easy. However, in the current studies 
it may not have been as clear to the participants which semantic valence a word 
carried, and to a greater degree in which prosodic valence a word was spoken. 
Therefore, the evaluation task would have been harder than in previous studies. 
Indeed there is evidence, in the modulation of the PRP effect in the prosody study, 
that participants found evaluation of some prosodies easier than others. In Study 4 
participants appeared to find it easier, as assessed with reaction time for the visual 
target (which can give an indication of ease to select an evaluation response), to select 
their evaluation response as happy rather than as sad or neutral. Perhaps the difficult 
evaluation task forced recruitment of a strategy of deeper processing, and other non-
metaphoric knowledge was used to make the evaluation judgement. If the inclusion of 
neutral stimuli does lessen the contribution of metaphoric mapping, the strong view of 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory outlined in the introduction is not supported.  In fact, 
according to grounded cognition theory, a strategy of deeper processing (as when 
evaluation is hard) should have resulted in greater (not lesser) recruitment of 
conceptual metaphoric representations (Barsalou et al., 2008; Brookshire et al., 2010).  
 The measure in this thesis of activation of conceptual metaphors was shifts in 
attention. No GOOD IS UP shifts in attention were observed, thus there was no 
evidence of activation of the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor. Yet participants in 
the current studies could clearly complete the evaluation task which suggests that 
conceptual metaphorical mapping may not be all there is to representation of emotion 
concepts. In order to evaluate the word another kind of representation must have been 
activated. Proponents of grounded cognition theory, and Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
more specifically, are focused on the importance of grounding to the detriment of 
evidence to the contrary. For instance, as pointed out by Louwerse and Jeuniaux 
(2008), experiments that provide evidence for grounded cognition representations do 
not provide evidence against abstract, symbolic representation. Analogous to the 
black swan problem (Popper, 1959), if researchers only test for the presence of 
conceptual metaphor representations, they will not find evidence for non-grounded 
representation. There is also the problem of comparison. Grounded cognition theorists 
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(for example Johnson, 2007 and Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, in the conceptual metaphor 
literature) criticise “traditional theories”. All non-grounded theories cannot be lumped 
together (Murphy, 1996) and indeed aspects of “traditional theories” may be valid 
descriptions of representation. A less extreme view of Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
in conjunction with aspects of “traditional theories” may be able to incorporate the 
findings of this thesis more parsimoniously than either perspective alone. The neutral 
context in which participants evaluated the emotional stimuli may have reduced 
activation in the grounded, conceptual metaphor representation system. Reduced 
activation of conceptual metaphor mappings would have resulted in the lack of 
GOOD IS UP shifts in attention. However, participants still evaluated the emotional 
linguistic stimuli correctly. Thus, there must be another representational system, 
which does not consist of metaphoric source-target domain mappings, access to which 
allowed participants to complete the evaluation task. This is the multiple systems 
view of grounded cognition.  
 Multiple systems. 
 In a similar vein to Dual-Coding Theory (Paivio, 1971; 1986), the less 
extreme, multiple systems, version of grounded cognition is that there are at least two 
systems of representation; one that recruits the perceptuomotor system and one that is 
separate from the perceptuomotor system (e.g. Barsalou et al. 2008). The non-
grounded system stores abstract-linguistic information. Both the linguistic and 
grounded systems underlie representation of emotional concepts; however recruitment 
of the systems is contextually determined. 
Grounded cognition evidence. 
Evidence up to the current date for contextually-activated representation 
systems mainly comes from the general grounded cognition literature, not specifically 
from the conceptual metaphor literature. Recent thinking in the grounded cognition 
literature strongly advocates a role for context in simulation, and while embodiment 
definitely seems to be part of the representation of emotional concepts, grounding is 
not seen as automatic (Winkielman et al., 2008). There are an increasing number of 
recent studies in the general grounded cognition literature which point to the existence 
of more than one representation system; one grounded, one non-grounded.  
An example from the emotion literature illustrates that facial muscle activation 
seems to be contextually determined. In a series of experiments, Niedenthal et al. 
(2009) examined facial muscle activation by emotional concrete and abstract 
74 
 
concepts. Electromyographic (EMG) activity congruent with the emotion of the word 
was only observed when the context was appropriate. In one experiment all 
participants were required to complete a property generation task to emotional words. 
In a clever manipulation half of the participants were required to imagine they were 
generating features of the words for a close friend (the hot audience context 
condition), the other half were required to imagine they were generating features of 
the words for a supervisor with whom the participant had a formal work level 
association (the cold audience context condition). The hypothesis was that the first 
group would employ a simulation strategy while the second group would employ a 
lexical association strategy. EMG activity measured in the two groups was consistent 
with the hypothesis. While there was no difference in the amount or properties of the 
words participants generated in the two conditions (both groups completed the task to 
the same level of performance), facial EMG activity congruent with the emotion of 
the properties being generated was observed to a greater extent in the hot audience 
group, suggesting they were simulating emotional experience. The difference between 
groups indicated that context can modulate the processes used to access emotion-
related representations. Implicit in such a conclusion is that there is more than one 
representational system, one grounded, one non-grounded.  
 All one system grounded cognition theories state that the grounded 
representation process is obligatory. Yet an increasing number of studies point to a 
non-obligatory role for the grounded conceptual system. See Havas et al. (2007) for a 
study illustrating that lexical processing level is an important boundary condition to 
define for observing embodied effects (but see van Dam, Rüschemeyer, Lindemann, 
& Bekkering, 2010 for a counter example). The grounded conceptual system seems 
not to be activated automatically. It seems to only be engaged when the context 
accentuates the perceptuomotor nature of the concept referred to by the word. See 
Shintel and Nusbaum (2008) for an example of contextual constraining of embodied 
effects in spoken language and see Raposo, Moss, Stamatakis, and Tyler (2009) and 
Rüschemeyer, Brass, and Friedericic (2007) for neuroimaging studies demonstrating 
contextual embodiment.  
Multiple systems in Conceptual Metaphor Theory. 
The multiple systems view of grounded cognition has been taken up more 
slowly by conceptual metaphor theorists than in other grounded cognition literatures. 
Meier and Robinson’s (2005) predictions, derived from Lakoff and Johnson (1999) 
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who are absolute in the view of conceptual metaphors in representation, test the strong 
version of Conceptual Metaphor Theory. Murphy (1996) states that the strong view of 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory is not an accurate description of our representation 
system. A weaker view, in which metaphorical mappings shape our representations 
but are not the totality of them, is suggested as an alternative by Murphy.  
The weaker view removes serious problems with Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory, such as the problem of multiple metaphorical mappings for a target domain. 
Good is not only up, but also close and warm. Sometimes the source domains may be 
contradictory for a given target domain. For example, anger is negative so should 
activate the BAD IS DOWN metaphor. Anger is not always distant though. Some 
forms of anger may activate an ANGER IS CLOSE metaphor (see Harmon-Jones, 
2003 for a discussion of whether anger is associated with approach or withdrawal 
motivation). A central component of Conceptual Metaphor Theory is that the 
metaphorical mappings are necessary and are obligatorily activated. If that is the case, 
then for concepts with conflicting metaphors, multiple metaphors should be problem 
for understanding spoken and written language, yet normally functioning people do 
not have confused representational systems. A weaker view of Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory, in which there is more to representation than metaphoric mappings, allows 
for flexible representations. Certain source-target domain mappings may play more of 
a role in some situations than in others with context determining which mappings are 
activated. 
Different questions need to be asked and different predictions need to be tested 
to reveal a more realistic, non-absolute, view of the nature of conceptual 
representation. Fourteen years after Murphy (1996), Brookshire et al. (2010) also 
posit that we need to start establishing a different view of the role of conceptual 
metaphors in representation. Rather than test whether metaphorical mappings are a 
necessary component of representation, we should test under what conditions 
metaphorical mappings are activated and whether the mappings contribute to 
representation. Rather than test whether metaphorical mappings are recruited at 
automatic processing stages, we should test the limits of automaticity and explore the 
contexts in which stronger and weaker recruitment of metaphorical mappings are 
observed. Rather than all or nothing, automaticity in conceptual metaphor recruitment 
may be a continuum.  
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As an example of how researchers could conduct research with these revised 
aims, Brookshire et al. (2010) explored the effect that practice and context have on 
conceptual metaphor processing. Practice was operationalised as the difference in 
recruitment of the GOOD IS UP metaphor for the first and second presentations of 
emotional words. Participants were required to identify the colour, purple or green, in 
which positive and negative words were displayed. The valence of the words was not 
central to the task, and the task could be completed with participants ignoring the 
valence of the words. The verticality aspect of the task was in the positioning of the 
response keys for the colour task. If the word was in one colour participants released a 
centralised key and pressed a key positioned in the upper position, if the word was in 
the other colour participants pressed a key positioned in the lower position. The 
metaphorical mapping between the valence of the word and the button pressed could 
be congruent with respect to the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor, positive word-
upper key/ negative word-lower key, or incongruent, positive word-lower key/ 
negative word-upper key. 
For the first presentation of words, a congruency effect was observed. 
Participants were faster to identify the colour of words when the metaphorical 
mapping was congruent than when it was incongruent. That this GOOD IS UP 
congruency effect was observed even when the word meaning was not central to the 
task, suggested to Brookshire et al. (2010) that the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor 
is strongly activated at automatic processing stages. For the second presentation of 
words, no congruency effect was observed. Participants were not faster to identify the 
colour of words when the metaphorical mapping was incongruent.  
In order to explore what could be contributing to the modulation of the 
congruency effect, Brookshire et al. (2010) conducted another experiment in which 
the nature of filler trials was manipulated. The experimental trials were identical to 
the first experiment but rather than the colour task performed on the experimental 
emotion words, the filler trials were presented in a white font which cued participants 
that they had to perform a semantic or visual judgement on these words. Half of the 
participants were presented with filler trials for which the task was to decide whether 
the word was an animate or inanimate object. The other half of the participants were 
presented with filler trials for which the task was to decide whether a red X was 
present in a grid of grey squares. Thus, the animacy task oriented participants to 
attend to the meaning of the stimuli, while the red X task oriented participants to 
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attend to a perceptual feature of the stimuli. Participants were faster to identify the 
font colour on experimental trials when pressing the upper key after positive words 
and when pressing the lower key after negative words than vice versa. Importantly 
though, this GOOD IS UP congruency effect was only observed in the data of the 
participants whose attention was oriented to the meaning of the words. 
 Brookshire et al. (2010) have begun to test the relevance of a weaker view of 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory and to probe the boundary conditions under which 
metaphorical mappings play a role in conceptual representation. The Brookshire et al. 
study suggests that context, in the from of task demands, specifically the level to 
which words are processed, is an important boundary condition for observing 
metaphor congruent perceptual processes. Thus, conceptual metaphors such as GOOD 
IS UP may not be activated obligatorily. By asking more specific research questions 
than whether or not representation is grounded, research can be conducted which is 
more informative as to the nature of representation.  
Explaining the current results. 
I have presented examples of studies which suggest that there is more to 
representation than only a grounded system utilising the perceptuomotor systems of 
the brain. There must also be a non-grounded system, characterised by abstract, 
amodal, symbolic representations, which allows semantic tasks to be completed when 
the context is inappropriate for activating the grounded system. While not referencing 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory specifically, a recent theory, Linguistic and Situated 
Simulation (LASS; Barsalou et al., 2008) has been developed which includes two 
systems of representation in the mind. Barsalou et al. state that they are open to there 
being more than two systems. The point is that there is more than one system; at least 
one which is embodied, is grounded in the perceptuomotor systems (termed situated 
simulations), and at least one which relies on abstract, amodal linguistic statistical 
information. Both the linguistic system and the grounded system are activated when 
processing a linguistic form (Barsalou et al. focus on words). The two systems are not 
modular and they interact; activation in one system modulates activity in the other 
system. The time course of activation in the systems is a key part of LASS theory. 
Given past experimental evidence, Barsalou et al. (2008) assume that the situated 
simulation system is activated early and automatically, at least by 200ms. However, 
the linguistic system reaches peak activation before the situated simulation system. 
Furthermore, under certain circumstances the central executive can prolong the 
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majority role of the linguistic system. See Barsalou et al. for a summary of evidence 
supporting the LASS theory.  
 The LASS theory is just one example of a multiple systems theory with at 
least one grounded system (see Dove, 2011; Louwerse & Connell, 2010; and 
Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2008, 2010 for additional examples of multiple systems 
theories). LASS may not be an accurate, or a complete picture of how the mind 
achieves representation of emotional concepts. The point is that multiple systems 
theories, in conjunction with experimental evidence, provide a compelling argument 
for the cognitive reality of more than one representational system for processing 
emotion related stimuli (semantically or prosodically), at least one of which is non-
grounded. Regardless of the specific details of the systems, the presence of two 
systems could also allow for the role of context to be elucidated in the activation of 
conceptual metaphors. There is no equivalent to the LASS theory in the conceptual 
metaphor literature. However, it is conceivable that a similar multiple systems 
architecture is valid for Conceptual Metaphor Theory. There could be both a 
grounded system, utilising metaphoric mappings between perceptuomotor source 
domains and conceptual target domains, and a linguistic system, utilising some type 
of non-grounded (statistical, abstract, amodal) knowledge, which underlie 
representation of emotion concepts.  
In fact, the nature of the stimuli used in the studies reported in this thesis could 
have increased reliance on the non-grounded linguistic system. It was expected that 
the conceptual metaphor GOOD IS UP should only be recruited during evaluation of 
emotional words, either semantic or prosodic, and not during evaluation of words 
which were both semantically and prosodically neutral. However, the spoken 
emotional words in these studies were never both semantically and prosodically 
emotional. Analogous to studies which demonstrate that grounded cognition 
congruent effects were only observed when the context is appropriate, perhaps in this 
thesis the presence of at least either neutral semantics or prosody on each trial and the 
inclusion of completely (semantically and prosodically) neutral words set an 
inappropriate context and the conceptual metaphor GOOD IS UP was not activated or 
only minimally activated. Instead the non-grounded system may have been more 
dominant, sufficient to complete the evaluation task. If the conceptual-metaphor 
system was not activated of course no GOOD IS UP congruent shifts in attention 
would be observed.  
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It is possible to test the role of context in activating the GOOD IS UP 
conceptual metaphor with a small modification of the studies in this thesis. 
Participants would listen to semantically positive, negative, and neutral words spoken 
in congruent emotional prosodies. That is, semantically-positive words spoken in 
happy prosody, semantically-negative words spoken in sad prosody, and 
semantically-neutral words spoken in neutral prosody. Given that the contextual 
boundary conditions for spoken language are unknown, it would be prudent to 
conduct two versions of the proposed study, one with semantically-neutral words 
spoken in neutral prosody included and one with them excluded. If an appropriate 
context is necessary for the conceptual metaphor system to be reliably recruited, then 
GOOD IS UP metaphoric congruent shifts in attention should be observed when the 
spoken words are both semantically and prosodically emotional. Following positive 
words participants should be faster to respond to targets in the upper visual-field than 
in the lower visual-field, and following negative words participants should be faster to 
respond to targets in the lower visual-field than in the upper visual-field. In 
conjunction with this thesis’ results, affirmative evidence of this predication would 
indicate 1) that at least two systems, one grounded utilising conceptual metaphoric 
mappings, and one non-grounded, underlie representation of emotion concepts in 
spoken language; and 2) that recruitment of the representational systems is 
contextually determined.  
Spoken Language 
 If with future scrutiny it is determined that none of the other changes from the 
Meier and Robinson (2004) paradigm, including those described above (task 
component order, response modality, or context), are responsible for the lack of 
GOOD IS UP congruent shifts in attention in this thesis, the change in stimulus 
modality is the most likely the cause. The aim of this thesis was to add to theoretical 
understanding of Conceptual Metaphor Theory. To that end, the words in this thesis 
were presented in the spoken modality. In contrast, all of the previous studies which 
reported GOOD IS UP congruent perceptual effects with linguistic stimuli 
(Brookshire et al., 2010; Casasanto, 2008, as cited in Brookshire et al., 2010; Meier & 
Hauser, 2008, as cited in Crawford, 2009; Meier & Robinson, 2004, 2006; Weger et 
al., 2007) used written words. As laid out in the introduction investigation of the role 
of the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor in spoken word processing is interesting for 
evolutionary and complexity reasons. 
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 Evolution. 
 Simply put, the rationale for expecting GOOD IS UP attentional shifts during 
processing of spoken emotional words was that: 
a) according to all grounded cognition theorists, representation is 
achieved using the evolutionarily older perceptuomotor system. 
b) Speech is evolutionarily older than writing. 
c) As GOOD IS UP congruent shifts in attention (which are assumed to 
index access to the verticality-emotion mapping) have been observed during 
the evolutionarily younger reading process, shifts in attention should have 
definitely be observed during spoken language processing. 
See the introduction for a full summary of the argument. Laying aside all the other 
possible reasons for the lack of GOOD IS UP congruent attentional shifts, that this 
evolution argument is not supported is concerning for Conceptual Metaphor Theory. 
Lakoff and Johnson (2009) in fact say that conceptual metaphoric representation is 
obligatory. In conjunction with the context and multiple systems literature, this thesis 
would suggest that conceptual metaphoric representation is not obligatory. This 
violates the third, automaticity, prediction of Meier and Robinson.   
Complexity. 
As described in the introduction, spoken language is more complex than 
written language; information can be conveyed in the semantic and prosodic channels, 
which do not have to be congruent. It is important to remember that emotion related 
conceptual metaphors will not be the only conceptual metaphors relevant to 
representation of a word during spoken language processing. Multiple metaphors 
(Murphy, 1996) are especially likely to be activated by spoken words in which two 
channels of information are salient. For example, the HIGH PITCH IS UP metaphor 
used in Study 1 as a test of the suitability of the paradigm to observe metaphor 
congruent shift in attention, may also have been activated when processing emotional 
prosody. The prosodies used in Study 4 were consistent in their verticality mappings 
for both emotional and pitch target domains. Happy prosody is both positive and 
higher in pitch, target domains that map on to upper space, and sad prosody is both 
negative and lower in pitch, target domains that map on to lower space. However, if 
the HIGH PITCH IS UP metaphor was activated when processing prosody in this 
thesis, the doubling up of the emotion and pitch mappings should have increased the 
likelihood of observing faster response times to targets in the upper-visual field than 
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in the lower-visual field after happy prosody and of observing faster response times to 
targets in the lower visual-field than in the upper visual-field after sad prosody.  
If conceptual metaphors are not activated, or only minimally activated, during 
spoken language processing, then how large a role could conceptual metaphoric 
representation have in even more complex linguistic processing, such as processing of 
sentences or discourse? If future research rules out all alternative explanations (aside 
from the change to spoken word stimuli) for the lack of GOOD IS UP shifts in 
attention during spoken word processing, Conceptual Metaphor Theory must be 
reconsidered as a theory of emotional concept representation.  
Other Considerations 
 If conceptual metaphoric mappings are a cognitively real form of 
representation, the paradigm used in this thesis and the lack of GOOD IS UP 
congruent shifts in attention point to two other factors that should be considered: time 
course of conceptual metaphor activation and the relevance of dimensional versus 
categorical emotion. 
Time course.  
The time course of the recruitment of the two representational systems, one 
grounded and one-non grounded, will be a key component of any valid theory of 
representation (van Dam et al., 2010). Even the LASS theory has not yet elucidated 
the exact time course of the activation of the linguistic and situated simulation system. 
The SOAs used in this thesis may have allowed context to play a large role and 
precluded any possibility of observing automatic activation of the GOOD IS UP 
conceptual metaphor. According to Kotz and Paulmann’s (2011) multistep theory of 
emotional speech processing, context comes into play at later stages of cognition, 
which Kotz and Paulmann define as from approximately 400ms from the onset of a 
word. The shortest SOA was 400ms in the paradigm used in this thesis. Thus, the 
neutral context could have constrained processing on all trials. Obligatory activation 
of the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor may have been missed by the paradigm. 
Future studies should use shorter SOAs to explore the automaticity of the GOOD IS 
UP conceptual metaphor; although word length will limit the shortest SOA that can be 
used with spoken words. For example, if using the same stimuli as in this thesis (with 
the shortest word duration of 313ms), GOOD IS UP shifts in attention would 
probably not be observed with a 100ms SOA. Participants need to hear enough of the 
word to activate emotional evaluation processes.  
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Using a shorter SOA (such as 300ms) may not reveal that the GOOD IS UP 
conceptual metaphor is activated automatically. Chiou and Rich (2011) conducted the 
first thorough exploration of the automaticity of the HIGH PITCH IS UP conceptual 
metaphor. The series of studies conducted by Chiou and Rich demonstrated first, that 
the HIGH PITCH IS UP conceptual metaphor is only activated after context 
determines whether a pitch is high or low (relative pitch). Second, HIGH PITCH IS 
UP congruent shifts in attention do not appear until at least 300ms after the onset of 
the pitch cue. Third, the mapping between pitch and vertical location is not automatic; 
it is susceptible to top down control. Participants with training demonstrated the 
opposite shifts in attention; high pitch- lower visual field, low pitch- upper visual 
field. Chiou and Rich concluded that the activation of the HIGH PITCH IS UP 
conceptual metaphor lies between exogenous and endogenous processing. If a robust 
conceptual metaphor like the HIGH PITCH IS UP metaphor is not activated 
automatically, then it is unlikely that a less robust metaphor such as the GOOD IS UP 
metaphor will be activated automatically.  
 The Chiou and Rich (2011) studies suggest that the robust HIGH PITCH IS 
UP conceptual metaphor is not obligatorily activated but a similar thorough 
exploration of the time course of activation of the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor 
is needed before a similar conclusion can be made. The current paradigm could be 
useful for determining the time course of activation of systems of representation. An 
advantage of the paradigm used in this thesis, compared to Meier and Robinson 
(2004) is that SOA between the word and visual target is easily manipulated. The 
current paradigm would be suitable with the addition of more SOAs (and 
consequently more trials). A range of SOAs from 200ms (see Hauk & Pulvermüeller, 
2004) to 1200ms would cover the range of automatic and controlled processing 
stages. 
Dimensional versus categorical emotion. 
Researchers should also consider that there may not be a correspondence 
between all positive valenced emotions and upper space and all negative valenced 
emotions and lower space. All past psychological research into the cognitive reality of 
the GOOD IS UP metaphor treats emotion as two dimensional: positive and negative 
(Brookshire et al., 2010; Casasanto, 2008, as cited in Brookshire et al., 2010; Meier & 
Hauser, 2008, as cited in Crawford, 2009; Meier & Robinson, 2004, 2006; Weger et 
al., 2007). This thesis treats emotion as both dimensional and categorical. In Study 3 
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words of positive and negative semantic valence (dimensional emotion) were 
presented to participants, whereas in Study 4 happy and sad prosodies (categorical 
emotion) were presented to participants. The assumption is made that all positive 
emotions map onto upper space and all negative emotions onto lower space.  However 
it may be that some categorical emotional valences map more robustly onto upper and 
lower space than others.  
The consideration of variation in source domain recruitment by categorical 
valences is especially prudent for negative emotions. There are many more categories 
of negative emotions, including sad, fear, disgust, and anger, than positive ones. 
Happy is usually the one categorical emotion included as a positive emotion in 
psychological experiments. Linguistic evidence (i.e. use of corpus and dictionary 
data) suggests that the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor may be most relevant for 
happy and sad valences (Köveces, 2000) than for other valences such as anger and 
fear. Kövecses, who considers the mappings between positive valence and upper 
space, and between negative valence and lower space separately, lists fifteen 
conceptual metaphors underlying the representation of happiness including HAPPY 
IS UP, HAPPY IS LIGHT, HAPPY IS WARM, HAPPINESS IS HEALTH, and 
HAPPINESS IS FLUID IN A CONTAINER and fourteen for sadness including SAD 
IS DOWN, SAD IS DARK, SADNESS IS A LACK OF HEAT, SADNESS IS AN 
ILLNESS. There are more variations on the HAPPY IS UP conceptual metaphor than 
for the other conceptual metaphors of emotion (i.e. HAPPY IS LIGHT). There are 
also more variations on the HAPPY IS UP conceptual metaphor than for the converse 
conceptual metaphor SAD IS DOWN, for example HAPPINESS IS BEING OFF 
THE GROUND and HAPPINESS IS BEING IN HEAVEN do not have a 
complementary SAD version. Which categorical emotions the GOOD IS UP 
metaphor applies to is an important boundary condition to define in both written and 
spoken word processing. 
Conclusions 
 This thesis tested for evidence of activation of the GOOD IS UP conceptual 
metaphor in processing of spoken emotional words. The aim was to learn more about 
the nature of conceptual representations activated during processing of spoken 
language, and emotional semantics and emotional prosody were considered 
separately. If evaluation of spoken emotional words activated metaphorical 
representation, then GOOD IS UP consistent shifts in attention should have been 
84 
 
observed in response times to targets in the upper and lower visual field. No shifts in 
attention were observed when participants evaluated semantically-emotional words in 
Study 3, or when participants evaluated prosodically-emotional words in Study 4. A 
multiple systems view of Conceptual Metaphor Theory in which there are at least two 
contextually activated systems of representation, one involving grounded source-
target domain metaphorical mappings, and one involving non-grounded linguistic 
information, may explain the lack of attentional shifts observed. Future research 
should explore the boundary conditions on automaticity and recruitment of conceptual 
metaphorical mappings.   
 The majority of experiments conducted with the aim of understanding 
representation seem to rely on written stimuli. This thesis demonstrates that it is 
important not to construct theories of conceptual representation only on the basis of 
evidence from written language processing. Given that speech is evolutionarily older 
than writing and that grounded cognition theorists claim that representation is 
achieved using the evolutionarily older perceptuomotor system (e.g. Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999) it was expected that stronger evidence for Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory would be observed with spoken words. This was not the case. Spoken 
language is also more complex. Information can be conveyed through the semantic 
and prosodic channels. Thus, by overly relying on written stimuli, we may have 
created a biased or unrealistic view of the nature of representation and even cognition 
in general (Wurm et al., 2001, 2004). Any valid theory of representation must be able 
to account for findings in both written and spoken language processing.  
Recent research in Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Brookshire et al., 2010) is 
driven by more complex questions than “is representation embodied or not?”. By 
asking fine grained questions we may gain more information about the nature of 
representation. This strategy of refining boundary conditions needs to be extended 
further into Conceptual Metaphor Theory. The previous studies using written 
emotional words may have serendipitously selected the necessary boundary 
conditions for GOOD IS UP congruent perceptual processing to be observed. This 
thesis has taken the first step in exploring metaphoric representation during 
processing of spoken emotional words. From the four studies conducted in this thesis 
I can only conclude that representation of emotion-related concepts is not solely 
achieved with conceptual metaphor mappings. Exploration of the boundary conditions 
under which conceptual metaphors play a role in emotional language processing in 
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written versus spoken language will shed more light on the role of the GOOD IS UP 
conceptual metaphor in representation of emotional concepts. 
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Appendix A: Target-present Word Lists 
 
Target-present word lists used in Studies 3 and 4 
 Positive-
semantics 
List 
Negative-
semantics 
list 
Neutral List Happy-
prosody 
List 
Sad-
prosody 
List 
1 baby afraid doll avenue basket 
2 beautiful assault appliance barrel bowl 
3 brave burial autumn book butter 
4 cake cancer cabinet building chair 
5 comfort crisis chance chin clothing 
6 diamond dead city clock column 
7 elegant devil coast coin cork 
8 excitement disaster context cord custom 
9 fantasy failure cottage elbow dress 
10 gentle gloom fish fabric gender 
11 gift grief foot fork green 
12 heart hardship fur highway hand 
13 holiday hate glacier hotel history 
14 hope hurt hairpin inhabitant jelly 
15 joke infection hat item key 
16 kiss injury industry kettle lantern 
17 love insult journal locker machine 
18 luxury jail lawn market milk 
19 miracle misery metal method name 
20 music morgue news month office 
21 passion neglect opinion paper part 
22 peace poverty paint patent patient 
23 pillow rape pencil phase poster 
24 rescue sick plant quart quiet 
25 respect slave rattle salute revolver 
26 reward thief salad sphere scissors 
27 sleep torture seat teacher ship 
28 truth tragedy statue tower street 
29 warmth ulcer table trunk tennis 
30 wedding venom theory utensil truck 
31 win victim unit violin trust 
32 wish war whistle window watch 
 
